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Locus Standi And The Public Interest
by Dianne L. Haskett*
I.

INTRODUCTION

ONE OF THE most noteworthy developments in contemporary civil
procedure has been the recent growth of litigation by individuals and
groups seeking to vindicate the public interest.1 In the wake of the everincreasing pervasiveness of the leviathan of government, the tendency of
the public has been to look to the courts for a determination of policy
issues. Mistrustful of the other branches of government, 2 prospective litigants seek to challenge what they perceive as illegal official action and
unconstitutional governmental behaviour. They tend to enshrine the judiciary as the only governmental body which is above political obscurantism. The belief is that the judiciary "will reach a faster and more desirable resolution of [society's] problems than the legislative or executive
branches of government."8
The evolution of the public interest suit' as a vehicle for social re* B.A. (1974), University of Waterloo; LL.B. (1977), University of Western Ontario Law
School; LL.M. (1979), London School of Economics, University of London. The author practises law as a sole practitioner in London, Ontario.
See Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in United States of America, 23
BuFFALo L. REv. 343 (1974).
2 Archibald Cox has remarked that "[m]odern government is simply too large and too
remote, and too few issues are fought in elections, for a citizen to feel much more sense of
participation in the legislative process than the judicial." Quoted in Strong, Bicentennial
Benchmark: Two Centuries of Evolution in ConstitutionalProcesses, 55 N. C. L. Rlv. 1,
115 (1976). As Louis L. Jaffe has stated: "It has now become a commonplace [sic] that the
individual citizen in our vast, multitudinous complexes feels excluded from government .... For these reasons procedural devices, which enable citizen groups to participate
in the decision-making process and to invoke judicial controls, are very valuable." Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1968).
3 H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FATH 11 (1968).
4 Public interest suits are not to be confused with class action suits, although common
attributes may exist. The proper distinction is crystallized by Homburger, supra note 1, at
387:
Class actions proceed on the theory, or perhaps more appropriately fiction, that all
persons affected by the litigation are before the court, either in person or by representation. It is true that the class-representatives are self-chosen or, in defendant's classes, chosen by plaintiff; but the constitutional conscience of the court is
eased by the presence in court of persons whose claims typify those of all members of the class and by the lack of practicable alternatives for mass litigation.
There is normally no problem of standing to sue in class actions: for if the plaintiff is a proper party to press his individual claim, he invariably also has standing to sue on behalf of those whom he represents. Public interest actions are
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form has led many judges and legal scholars to question the appropriateness of judicial intervention into the field of policy-making. Public interest suits would seem to fly in the face of traditional notions of the
function of the Court. Whereas the Court has historically been viewed as
the proper forum for the adjudication of disputes between parties, public
interest litigants often do not fit into the traditional mould of what is
conceived of as a "proper party."'
The use of the Court as a public forum for the airing of policy issues
has traditionally been curtailed by judicial self-restraint, in the exercise
of w hich the standing of prospective litigants has been examined as a
threshold inquiry in the determination of the appropriateness of judicial
intervention. Compliance with locus standi, or the law of standing, has
consequently become a crucial hurdle to overcome for those litigants who
seek to bring legal action to advocate the public interest. Yet the erractic
development of standing principles has frustrated any attempts to reduce
the concept to precise enucleation. The concept of standing has been described as "among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public
7'
law"' and as "a hodge-podge of special instances and contradictions.
Professor Tushnet has declared that "the law of standing lacks a rational
conceptual framework [and that it] is little more than a set of disjointed
rules dealing with a common subject."
In an attempt to reduce these "disjointed rules" to a common denominator, it can be said that the various tests devised to determine the
requisite interest upon which a suit for judicial review may be founded
tend to focus first upon "whether the interest is, in the opinion of the
court, worthy of protection" and secondly, upon the propriety of judicial
intervention.9
Notwithstanding Justice Douglas' admonition that "[g]eneralizations
structured differently. Unlike the class action plaintiff, the public interest does
not purport to represent any particular individual. He acts as a spokesman for the
public at large or a segment of it. (Emphasis added).
6 Public interest litigants are what Professor Jaffe would call "non-Hohfeldian" or "ideological" plaintiffs because they seek not to assert the personal and proprietary interest of
the traditional Hohfeldian plaintiff (a phrase derived by Jaffe from W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923)), but rather the representational and public interest of a
non-Hohfeldian plaintiff in a public action. In Jaffe's terminology, a Hohfeldian plaintiff is
one who is seeking a determination that the has a right, a privilege, an immunity or a power.
See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1033.
' JudicialReview: Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 app. 498 (1966) (statement of Paul A. Freund) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Review Hearings].
Jaffe, Standing to Secure JudicialReview: PrivateActions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255, 258
(1961).
8 Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
663 (1977).
9 S. M. Tnio, Locus STANDI AND JuDicIL REVIEW 13-14 (1971).
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about standing to sue are worthless as such," 10 this article will proceed to
scrutinize the utilization of standing as a tool of judicial self-restraint and
as a sifting device in the determination of the propriety of judicial intervention into public interest controversies. In addition, the article will attempt to propound the "rational conceptual framework" which Tushnet
alleges the law of standing lacks," and to utilize this framework in an
explication of the major public interest cases which have confronted the
concept of standing.
In those cases in which judicial restraint is exercised to deny standing to public interest litigants, certain underlying inhibitory notions have
been brought to bear. Three such notions which consistently arise in cases
in which standing is in issue are related to the judicial conception of the
role, the power, and the limited resources of the Court.
A.

The Role of the Court

In the administration of justice in common law jurisdictions, the entire system has been geared towards the adjudications of disputes between parties. Many jurists would argue that
[t]his clash of adversaries, this dialectic conflict between opposite parties
is the most effective way, not only of securing that the interests of the
litigant parties are fully represented but also of ensuring that any public
interest that may arise or emerge in the proceedings will be12fully placed
before the Court and thus be safeguarded and represented.
Does this traditional conception of the role of the Court allow for the
adjudication of suits which directly involve interests transcending those
of the parties before the Court?" The plaintiff in a public interest suit is
not a traditional plaintiff:1 4 he does not seek to assert the violation of a
legal right personal to himself. Instead, he seeks to challenge the constitutionality of legislation or to assert the illegaility of official action. In doing
so, the plaintiff alleges no particular injury or infringement of rights beyond that felt by the public in general. 5
There exist a number of arguments for denying standing to those
plaintiffs who do not fit within the traditional mould of adversarial pro10 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp (Data Processing), 397 U.S. 150,
151 (1970).
1 Tushnet, supra note 8, at 663.
12 L H. Jacobs, The Representation of the Public Interest in English Civil Proceedings
6 (unpublished work).
13 See Homburger, supra note 1, at 343.
14 See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1034.
11 See Brilmayer, JudicialReview, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law
Method, 57 B. U. L. Rv. 807, 827 (1977): "The injury sustained, if any, is to the ideology or
social conscience of the plaintiffs." He argues, therefore, that "the use of non-traditional
plaintiffs sacrifices an important feature of judicial review: the sensitivity of courts to the
impact of challenged laws upon affected individuals." Id.
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ceedings. One such argument has been based upon the contention that
only concrete adverseness can assure that the issues are framed and
presented with sufficient specificity for consideration by the Court.16 It is
the substance of such a contention that only a party whose legal position
is affected by the Court's judgement can be relied upon to present a serious, thorough and complete argument.17 Such contention, however, ignores the fact that many public interest litigants are similarly committed
to their cause, and will fight for it just as vehemently and will prepare for
its presentation just as, if not more, meticulously as private litigants."
Professor Jaffe, in his consideration of the propriety of judicial intervention into issues raised by what he calls "ideological" or "non-Hohfeld
ian" plaintiffs, points out that the element of financial investment in litigation is functional in ensuring a serious and proper presentation:
If it were thought that self aggrandizement is a more dependable motive
than ideological interest, I would point out that it usually requires a
financial outlay to undertake a lawsuit, so that once launched on the lawsuit the ideological plaintiff has, at least, committed a sum of money and
so, in some sense, has a financial investment to protect. But the very
fact of investing money in a lawsuit from which one is to acquire no further monetary profit argues, to my mind, a quite exceptional kind of interest, and one peculiarly indicative of a desire to say all that can be
said in support of one's contention."'
Another argument for denying standing to a non-traditional plaintiff
concerns the res judicata effect of a judicial pronouncement. The fear is
that the courts, in entertaining proceedings outside of the traditional adversarial context, may prejudice persons not party to the litigation.
Whereas the effect of res judicata in disputes as between parties is to
preclude only those parties from subsequent litigation of the same issues,20 public interest suits evoke broader judicial pronouncements and
the res judicata effect is more far-reaching.

It must be noted, however, that when the Court is considering impugned legislation or allegedly illegal official action which a public interest litigant seeks to attack, it is a matter of public interest that matters
be set right and the effect upon the public as a whole can therefore be
seen as a right and proper consequence of the determination of the
16 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17 See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1037.
18 But see Homburger, supra note 1, at 348: ...

the very fact of ideological zeal may

make such plaintiffs poor representatives because they tend to take risks in instituting
broadly phrased challenges."
11Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1037; see also Kennedy, Beyond 'Sunshine' - PromotingEffective Citizen Participationin the Federal Administrative Process, 13 TRIAL 41, 43 (1977).
10 See Brilmayer, supra note 15, at 823, where he states, "[o]nce threat of harm is established, that the judgment will have a res judicata effect as to the parties guarantees that
the court is promulgating rules not in the abstract but incident to the determination of
rights of litigants before it."
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Court.

B. The Power of the Court - Separation of Powers Notions
Central to a determination of the propriety of judicial intervention is
the concept of the Court as an intrinsically distinct branch in the tripartite allocation of governmental power. The notion of separation of powers
has often served to bolt the doors of standing to litigants seeking a determination by the judiciary on public interest issues.
According to the notion of separation of powers, the three main
branches of government - the executive, the legislature and the judiciary each have their respective and exclusive powers. In a democracy, the legislature is in power because of, and is therefore 'ultimately responsible to,
the will of the majority. If it takes legislative measures or embarks upon
programs which are unappealing to the public at large, the power of displacement rests in that majority. The legislature's machinery for the instigation and administration of social change is intricate and extensive.
Its fact gathering techniques range from departmental investigations
through committee hearings to full scale governmental inquiries. "In any
one of these settings, expert knowledge can be presented and sifted in its
full complexity and then assessed by legislators who have varying backgrounds and experience and represent many different constituencies
among the public."2 2 The judiciary, on the other hand, is not a representative institution; it has no initiating powers and is without a staff for the
gathering of information.2 3 Therefore, it is often argued that the judiciary
should leave issues of public policy to the exclusive territory of the
legislature.
The legislature receives its mandate from the majority, and in fulfilling the terms of that mandate, must meet the approval of the majority as
to what is in the public interest. Consequently, certain less influential interests may be overlooked or overridden.24 The judiciary, as an independent branch, must apply higher principles of justice to all, including the
minority interests which may appear to the legislature to be inimical to
the will of the majority. The Court's aloofness from the fray of public
opinion can in itself be a great advantage when it becomes necessary to
adjudicate fairly upon situations involving individuals or groups who are
" See G. STRAYER, JUDIcIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 124 (1968). See also
Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make
Rights Effective, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 181, 210 (1978), wherein it is argued that the traditional notion of res judicata "be modified in order to allow the effective judicial protection

of diffuse rights."
"P.
"

WEILER, IN THE LAST RESORT 47

(1974).

See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1037.

2, See J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF

LEGAL RIGHTS 76 (1978): "Public interest law clients, for the most part, turn to the law
because they lack the resources to press their interests in the market or the political
arenas."
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either unrepresented
in the political arena or seen as unpopular by the
25
general public.
The two classic viewpoints on the question of the extent to which the
aspect of the separation of powers notion which emphasizes the majority/
minority distinction should influence or inhibit judicial intervention into
public policy are presented by Philip B. Kurland and Louis L. Jaffe. According to Kurland, the Court's most important function of protecting
individuals against the overstepping purview of government and minorities against oppression by majorities is essentially anti-majoritarian and
therefore:
it ought not to intervene to frustrate the will of the majority except
where it is essential to its function as guardian of interests that would
otherwise be unrepresented in the government of the country. It must,
however, do more than tread warily. It must have the talent and recognize the obligation to explain and perhaps persuade the majority's representatives that its reasons for frustrating majority rule are good ones."
As an advocate of greater judicial intervention in public interest issues, Louis B. Jaffe declares:
From the very beginning, both our Constitution and our practice has
sought to protect the individual qua individual and qua member of minority from the abuse of power by the majority or by government in the
name of the majority, despite the fact that majority rule through representation is the central institution of our democracy. Futhermore, democracy in our tradition emphasizes citizen participation as much as it
does majority rule. Citizen participation is not simply a vehicle for mi27
nority protection, but a creative element in government and lawmaking.
C. The Limited Resources of the Court - or - The Floodgates Fear
Much of the reticence of the judiciary to intervene in matters of public interest per se goes beyond the traditional notion of the role of the
Court and beyond the theoretical limitation" on the power of the Court;
it involves a matter of much more practical suasion. Simply stated, many
of the judiciary fear that to open wide the door of the Court to public
interest litigants would be to risk opening the virtual floodgates to a multiplicity of proceedings. It is felt that these litigants "disproportionately
divert the Court's attention and energy from pressing criminal, anti-trust
25

The case of the unpopular client and the harassment of lawyers for the representa-

tion thereof is examined in V. CoUNTRYNAN & T. FiNMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN

SOCIETY

576 et seq. (1966).
21 P. KuRLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 204 (1970).

Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1045.
The limitation on the power of the Court under the notion of separation of powers is
generally considered in the United States to be a matter of doctrinal application arising out
of Article III of the Constitution. But see text accompanying notes 84-86, infra.
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or other private civil litigation. '29
This inhibition, although in theory unrelated to a standing analysis,30
has in practice persistently been applied as a reason for denying standing.
The burden on the "limited resources of the Court" is thereby reduced,
"not so much from the elimination of the individual case in which the
plaintiff is held to lack standing as from the likelihood of the exclusion of
31
that type of case from the demand function and from future queries.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF STANDING As APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES

COURT

In the United States, the Supreme Court has articulated numerous
tests for establishing the standing of public interest litigants. These tests
have varied according to the prevailing judicial conception of the function
of the Court and the judicial perception of the significance of the issues
32
raised.
A.

Frothingham to Flast

The influence of the above mentioned inhibitory notions upon the
exercise of judicial restraint is clearly apparent in Massachussetsv. Mellon (Frothingham),33the classic American pronouncement on standing.
In that case, standing was denied to a federal taxpayer who sought to
challenge the constitutionality of an Act of Congress which provided for
federal grants to state programs aimed at reducing maternal and infant
mortality. The plaintiff argued that the grant-in-aid program was in excess of the powers of Congress in that it encroached upon the power of
34
local self government reserved to the States by the tenth amendment.
In founding her standing upon the status of taxpayer, it was the
9 Schaffner, Standing and the Propriety of Judicial Intervention: Reviving a Tra-

tional Approach?, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 944, 945 (1977).
30 Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv.
645, 669 (1973), argues that the standing inquiry should essentially be directed towards an
examination of whether the plaintiff is a "proper party" and whether he has a "sufficient
personal interest" in the litigation.
31 Scott asserts that standing principles have two distinct functions: the rationing of
scarce judicial resources and the determination of the Judiciary's proper policy-making role.
Id. at 672.
32 P. KURLAND, supra note 26, at 2, asserts that the United States Supreme Court "has
always operated-and operates still-somewhere between the judicial mode and the political mode." The treatment by the American courts of public policy issues is considered by J.
GROSSMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 28 (1972): "Even though

Americans do not usually perceive their courts as policy-makers, they often bring important
controversies to them. The power of courts to review the constitutionality of legislative and
executive action, commonly called the power of 'judicial review,' constantly involves American courts in conscious policy-making."
33 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
3,

Id. at 475.
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plaintiff's contention that she would be adversely affected by the impugned appropriations due to the increased burden of future taxation.
She asserted that to be so burdened was in effect to be deprived of her
property without due process of law.3 5 While recognizing the litigable interest of a municipal taxpayer in the proper application of funds by his
municipality,"6 the Court was unprepared to extend the notion of taxpayer standing to the federal context where the effect of an expenditure
upon future taxation was ostensibly "remote, fluctuating, and uncertain."'37 A distinction was drawn between the "direct and immediate" interest of municipal taxpayer" and the "comparatively minute and indeterminable" interest of a federal taxpayer who shares that interest with
millions of others.39
Mr. Justice Sutherland, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
seemed to shudder at the "bare suggestions" of taxpayer standing per
se.4 0 The judicial fear of the multiplicity of proceedings which might ensue with the "attendant inconveniences" was such as to sustain the conclusion of the Court that some direct injury beyond that suffered by an
individual taxpayer must be established in order to satisfy standing
requirements.41
The separation of powers doctrine was invoked to explain the impropriety of judicial intervention into a field of inquiry which was seen as
essentially legislative. According to this doctrine, whereby the functions
of government are exclusively apportioned, the Court found the judiciary
to have "no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the
ground that they are unconstitutional."4 2 Rather, its power was held- to
be limited to the exercise of ascertaining and declaring the law as applicable to situations of specific controversy arising from some direct injury
suffered or threatened which presents a justiciable issue.43 It was held
that a prospective party seeking to invoke the power of the judiciary has
not satisfied the "direct injury" requirement if he is able merely to estab3

Id. at 486.

36 !d.

Id. at 487.
Id. at 486.
" Id. at 487.
40 As stated by Justice Sutherland:
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer
may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review but also in
respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires
the outlay of public money, and whose validity may be questioned. The bare suggestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes so far to sustain
the conclusion which we have reached, that a suit of this character cannot be
maintained.
Id. at 487.
37

38

41 Id.

42Id. at 488.
43 Id.
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lish that he suffers injury "in some indefinite way in common with people
44
generally."
Although Frothinghamwas primarily concerned with the standing of
a taxpayer to bring suit, the broader pronouncements on the concept of
standing in terms of general judicial restraint and reluctance to adjudicate upon constitutional issues" survived intact for over 40 years as an
effective barrier to the litigation of public interest suits.
In 1937, Ex parte Levitt" reaffirmed the principle that a private litigant may invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive
or legislative action only when he can show that he has sustained, or is
immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of that
action and not when he is able to show only a general interest common to
47
all members of the public.
Tennessee Electric Power Company v. T. V.A. 48 tightened the "direct
injury" principle by requiring a concomitant allegation by litigants of a
violation of a legal right" sufficient to set them apart from other members of the general public.5 0 This "legal rights" requirement, however, was

subsequently disposed of in 1940 in F.C.C. v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station.51 In Sanders, the economic injury to the complainant, even in
the absence of a legally protected interest, was held to be sufficient to
52

satisfy the "direct injury" requirement for standing.
44 Id.

4" This reluctance was reiterated in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936), where the Court emphasized "the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress." Id. at 345. In its decision, the Court outlined a
series of seven rules under which it has avoided constitutional adjudications. Id. at 346-48.
See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where it was held that the Court could not rule
on the constitutionality of a statute unless called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. There the gist of the question of standing was held to rest
upon whether the litigant had alleged "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. at 204.
46 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
47 Id. at 634.
49 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
" Such a right was defined as "one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Id.
at 137.
SO This stricter requirement was also applied in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113, 125 (1948), where the Court declared that in order to have standing to sue, a litigant
must demonstrate "an injury or threat to a particular right of [his] own, as distinguished
from the public's interest in the administration of the law."
S 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See also Homburger, supra note 1, at 392: "Retrospectively
seen, Sanders sounded the death knell to the 'legal rights' doctrine."
02 309 U.S. at 476-77. See also Scripps Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
Both Sanders and Scripps Howard involved the application of the Communications Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 416, §402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), which specifically conferred standing
upon "aggrieved persons" to seek judicial review under the statute. For further discussion of
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The possibility of state taxpayer standing was acknowledged in Everson v. Board of Education" and in Doremus v. Board of Education" for
situations wherein "special injury" could be established. It was not until
the 1968 decision of Flast v. Cohen,55 however, that the doors of standing
began to creak open to the possibility of airing broader public interest
causes in the courts.
As in FrothinghaM," the plaintiff in Flast sought to establish standing by the assertion of status as taxpayer.57 The case involved a challenge
to the constitutionality of an Act of Congress which appropriated federal
funds for the financial support of private religious schools.5 8 The plaintiff
attacked the statute on the ground that it violated the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment.59 Noting that the Establishment Clause
specifically limits the taxing and spending power conferred upon Congress by article I, section 8 of the Constitution, the Court held that the
plaintiff as taxpayer had standing to challenge congressional action which
derogated from such limitations."0
In sharp distinction from the thrust of the Frothinghamdecision, the
Flast Court chose to focus not on the alleged injury of the plaintiff, but
rather on her alleged status.6 1 This status-oriented inquiry required that
the Court look beyond the plaintiff to the substantive issues to "determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the
claim sought to be adjudicated."6 2 Such an inquiry was considered to be
"essential to assure that [the plaintiff was] a proper and appropriate
party to invoke federal judicial power."63
The logical nexus which the Court required of a litigant asserting a
status of taxpayer was bifurcated: It was held that a logical link must be
established firstly between the status asserted and the type of legislative
enactment attacked" and secondly between that status and the precise
the treatment of the notion of statutory standing by the Court, see text accompanying notes
104-25, infra.
53 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
- 342 U.S. 429 (1952). In Doremus, the Court held that as long as "a direct dollars and
cents injury" could be established by the litigants, "it would not matter that their dominant
inducement to action was more religious than mercenary [for it] is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite financial interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 434-35.
- 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
6 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
57 392 U.S. at 84.
" Id. at 85. For an interesting outline of the political/legal background of Flast, see J.
ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 337-40 (1977).
" 392 U.S. at 86.
60 Id. at 105-06.
41 392 U.S. at 101.
42

63

Id. at 102.
Id.

6 Id.
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nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. 5 Although no member
of the Court gave reasons why the "logical nexus" test should have the
magical effect of establishing standing," there is a possible explanation.
For whatever reason, the Court apparently wished to preserve the Frothingham principles. Yet, without the Flast exception, the Establishment
Clause could have been rendered meaningless, for even if Congress openly
violated the Constitution by establishing and financing a religion, it could
be argued, according to strict Frothingham principles, that no one suf7
fered a particular injury sufficient to challenge the Congressional action.
According to the Court in Flast, the plaintiff in Frothingham had
been able to establish the first nexus, i.e., between the plaintiff's status as
taxpayer and the federal spending program she. attacked, but had lacked
standing because of her failure to establish the second nexus, i.e. her constitutional attack on the Maternity Act was not based on an alleged
breach of a specific constitutional limitation upon the taxing and spending power."
The significance of the Flastdecision lies in the constitutionalization
of the standing requirement.5 ' While the Frothingham approach to the
standing issue was from a broad conceptual perspective with the abovementioned inhibitions on judicial intervention clearly in view,70 the Flast
approach brought the constitutional aspects into sharp focus. The threshold inquiry in Flast focussed on article HI of the Constitution, which restricts the function of the Court to the consideration of "cases" and "controversies. 7 1 The case or controversy requirement was held to be fulfilled
if the litigant could establish a personal stake in the outcome of the con73
troversy,7' such as that enunciated in Baker v. Carr.
Assuming that the Flast Court did not obliterate the Frothingham

"In his dissent, Justice Harlan remarked upon the "absence of any connection between the Court's standard for the determination of standing and its criteria for the satisfaction of that standard." Id. at 124 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
,7 See Wilson, Opening the Door, Not the Floodgates: An Adaption of Canadian
Standing Criteria to Citizen or Taxpayer Suits in the United States 26 EMORY L. J. 185,
189 (1977).
" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 93-94.
" While the appellants in Fiast contended that Frothingham "expressed no more than
a policy of judicial self-restraint which can be disregarded when compelling reasons for assuming jurisdiction over a taxpayer's suit exist," 392 U.S. at 93, the government asserted
that Frothingham"announced a constitutional rule, compelled by the Article III limitations
on federal court jurisdiction and grounded in considerations of the doctrine of separation of
powers." Id. at 92. Chief Justice Warren, while having mentioned that the Frothingham
decision "can be read to support either position," considers that the concrete reasons given
in the decision for denying standing "suggest that the Court's holding rests on something
less than a constitutional foundation." Id. at 93.
7L
Le., the role, power, and limited resources of the Court. 262 U.S. at 448.
71 U.S. CONsT. art. I1, §2, cl. 1, construed in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 94.
7' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 99.
73 369 U.S. 186 (1962), approved 392 U.S. at 99.
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principles, this "personal stake" requirement could be satisfied in one of
two ways: (1) by the allegation of a "direct injury" beyond that suffered
in common with people generally; and (2) by the establishment of the
Court-created "logical nexus." This interpretation of Flast is borne out
7
and
by the later judgement of the Court in United States v.7 Richardson
5
War.
the
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
In delivering the opinion of the Court in Flast,Chief Justice Warren
introduced the three inhibitory notions - discussed above as influencing
the exercise of judicial restraint - into this constitutional analysis of the
standing requirement .7 According to his explication of article HI, the
words "cases" or "controversies" served two functions: (1) to limit the
role of the Court to "questions presented in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process;" and (2) to define the role of the judiciary "in a tripartite allocation
of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 7 7 He describes justiciability
as the "term of art" which is employed to "give expression to this dual
limitation"78 and the concept of standing as an "aspect of justiciability."9
While acknowledging the "complexities and vagaries" which surround the
concept of standing, displayed particularly by its confusion with other
concepts also extant under the rubric of justiciability,"0 the Chief Justice
pointed out the distinctiveness of standing in that it "focuses on the
party... and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated."81 Thus,
while a party may properly establish his standing to sue, the Court may
nevertheless decline to consider the merits because of some limitation on
the justiciability of the issue, such as the political question doctrine."'
According-to this analysis of article HI, Warren asserts that the constitutional question of standing is related only to the adversary context
7, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
75 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
76 392 U.S. at 95.
77

Id.

78 Id.

79 Id. at 98.

8o Id. at 99. See Scott, supra note 30, at 683:
In determining whether to decide a plaintiffs case, the courts at times have to
consider many factors besides whether the harm being done the plaintiff and

those in a similar position warrants the expenditure of judicial resources. These
factors are given a multitude of labels which overlap and are never clearly defined.
Along with standing one finds ripeness, exhaustion, waiver, implied preclusion, reviewability, justiciability, political question, advisory opinion, mootness, case or

controversy, and so on-the whole arsenal of considerations and techniques for
avoiding decision of the merits of plaintiff's claim.
" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 99. Chief Justice Warren went on to reiterate that "when
standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is
challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether
the issue itself is justiciable." Id. at 99-100.
82

Id. at 100.
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limitation and not to separation of powers problems, which should arise
only from the substantive issues. 88 He states that the possibility that "the
substantive issues in the litigation might be nonjusticiable" is not relevant to the incipient question of standing." Nevertheless, in order to determine whether there is a logical nexus to sufficiently establish the personal stake necessary for the article I case or controversy requirement,
Warren indicates that "it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the
substantive issues.85
The floodgates worry expressed in Frothinghamss was considered by
Warren in Flast to have rested upon something less than a constitutional
foundation, and to have suggested "pure policy considerations. 8 7 Critical
of Frothingham for its suggestion that the plaintiff's small tax bill precluded her standing,88 Warren pointed out that the assumptions which
the Frothingham Court brought to bear in their consideration of policy
have been rendered somewhat anachronistic by modern conditions, where
certain taxpayers have a greater monetary stake in the federal treasury
than they do in the municipal treasury.8 '
The fear expressed in Frothinghamthat the opening of the doors of
standing to one taxpayer qua taxpayer would lead to the inundation of
the Court with "countless similar suits"'9 was mitigated in Warren's opinion by the devices of class action and joinder which became available subsequent to the Frothingham decision."
Concurring in Flast,Justice Douglas considered the floodgates inhibition in relation to the determination of standing. In refuting the ominous prophecy that there would be an inundation of the courts if taxpayer's suits were permitted, Douglas contended, inter alia, that the
exercise of judicial discretion is an effective and appropriate means of
curtailment. 2 Douglas emphasized the anachronistic element of the
Frothingham rule against taxpayer standing and urged its obliteration.
Noting that Frothinghamhas been decided "in the heyday of substantive
due process when the courts were sitting on the wisdom or reasonableness
83

Id. at 102.

4'

Id. at 101.

Id. at 102.
262 U.S. at 487.
97 392 U.S. at 93.
8 Id.
8

8

88

Id.

262 U.S. at 487.
, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 94. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18-20, 23 (1966).
92 392 U.S. at 112 (Douglas, J., concurring), citing Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 339
(Sup. Ct. 1879), wherein the court stated: "The general indifference of private individuals to
public omissions and encroachments, the fear of expense in unsuccessful and even in successful litigation, and the discretion of the Court, have been, and doubtless will continue to
be, a sufficient guard to these public officials against too numerous and unreasonable
attacks."
80
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of legislation"' so that a "contrary result. . . might well have accentuated an ominous trend to judicial supremacy,"9 Douglas asserted that the
Courts no longer undertake to exercise such a revisionary power. He acknowledged the importance of the tripartite allocation of powers, but he
balanced this against the role which the judiciary was designed to play in
protecting the individual against constitutionally prohibited conduct by
the other two branches of government.95 In doing so, he remarked that
"[w]ith the growing complexities of government [the Court] is often the
one and only place where effective relief can be obtained"" and stated
that it is virtual abdication of responsibility for the Court to close its
doors to individuals alleging violations of constitutional guarantees.97 Also
germane to the separation of powers consideration was Douglas' adoption
of the philosophy that the importance of the role that the Court was
designed to play lay in its guardianship of basic rights against
majoritarian control.98
According to the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, the plaintiff in
Flast was not seeking to assert the personal and proprietary interest of a
traditional plaintiff, but rather the public and representative interest of a
non-Hohfeldian plaintiff in a public action; 9 realistically, her complaint
was brought, not as a taxpayer, but as a "private attorney-general" to
vindicate the public interest.100 Although Harlan did not think that nonHohfeldian plaintiffs as such were constitutionally excluded from the
Court, he placed great stress upon the relevancy of separation of powers
problems to the exercise of discretion on the standing issue in public interest litigation where "judicial forebearance [is] the part of wisdom." 101
He was fearful that unrestrained public actions might serve to "alter the
allocation of authority among the three branches of the Federal
10 2
Government.
It was suggested by Harlan that the separation of powers problems
which arise in public interest litigation could be solved by the Congressional authorization of such suits. Any hazards to the tripartite allocation
" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 107.

" Id.
95

Id. at 110.

"Id. at 111. As stated further by Justice Douglas, "The Constitution even with the
judicial gloss it has acquired plainly is not adequate." Id.
9Id.

"" Id. at 110.
9 Id. at 119 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Jaffe, supra note 2.

100 392 U.S. at 119 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 130. According to Harlan, "public

actions, whatever the constitutional provisions on which they are premised, may involve important hazards for the continued effectiveness of the federal judiciary. Although . . . such actions [are] within the jurisdiction
conferred upon the federal courts by Article III of the Constitution, there surely can be little
doubt that they strain the judicial function and press to the limit judicial authority." Id. at
132.
1'0 Id. at 130.
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of authority, he stated, would be "substantially diminished if public actions [were] pertinently authorized by Congress and the President."103
Before proceeding with an analysis of the judicial refinements of the
rules of standing pursuant to the Flast decision, this notion of "statutory
standing" must be examined.
B. Statutory Standing
The ability of Congress to confer standing upon public interest litigants has been confirmed by Justice Jerome Frank in the 1943 decision,
Associated Industries v. Ickes.1 4 In his judgement, Justice Frank coined
the concept of the "private attorney-general" as a characterization of
such litigants.10 5 He described Congress' power to confer standing as
follows:
Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to
bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory
duties; for there is an actual controversy and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or
not, to institute a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the
sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.10 6
The concurring opinion of Justice White in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company'" indicates that it is within the power of
Congress to confer standing by legislation when the Court might otherwise deny it.
The notion that a private individual should be permitted to vindicate
the public interest is derived historically from the "informer's action" and
"relator's action" in English law.108 In the United States, these qui tam
actions'" depend to a large extent on express congressional authorization.110 What then, is the constitutional basis for such "statutory standing" conferred by Congress? It has been suggested by Professor Tushnet
that the constitutional justification can be found in the Necessary and
Proper clause:""'
,03 Id. at 132.

1- 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
101 Id. at 704.

106 Id.
107 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).

See Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for
Legislative Reform, 10 RuT. L. Rav. 863, 882 (1977); see also Berger, Standing to Sue in
Public Actions: Is it a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L. J. 816-27 (1969).
109 See United States ex rel. Vance v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1038,
1040 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1973): "Qui tam is the phrase used to describe an informer's action
brought by one who sues for the State or the United States as well as for himself."
11 See Sedler, supra note 108, 882. See also Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts
Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1972).
"' U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 18.
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Congress, in exercising some enumerated power, may take substantive
action and also grant liberal standing as a necessary and proper means of
guaranteeing the effectiveness of that action. For example, Congress
passed the Clean Air Act pursuant to the commerce power, and chose to
extend standing to all citizens as a necessary
and proper means of securn2
ing the benefits conferred by the Act.
The authority of Congress to confer the standing necessary for qui
tam actions is now generally accepted, 113 even by those who would assert
the propriety of a restrictive standing approach. Justice Powell, for example, has recognized "the power of Congress to open the federal courts to
representatives of the public interest through specific statutory grants of
standing. 1 1 4 Harlan in Flast and Powell in Richardson viewed the statutory grant of standing as a possible means of overcoming the separation
of powers inhibition to public interest suits. In Flast, Harlan argued that
this inhibition could substantially be diminished if such suits were "pertinently authorized by Congress and the President."11 5 In the words of
Powell, "objections to public actions are ameliorated by the congressional
mandate. Specific statutory grants of standing in such cases alleviate the
conditions that make 'judicial forebearance the part of wisdom.' ,116
The authority of Congress to confer statutory standing cannot, however, in any situtation be extended so as to direct the Court to entertain
suits of a character which is inconsistent with the judicial function under
article 111.117 For example, it is not within the power of Congress to confer
jurisdiction on federal courts to render advisory opinions,11 8 to entertain
"friendly suits, '" 9 nor to resolve political questions.1 20 It is only where
the dispute is otherwise justiciable that the question of standing is within
2
the power of Congress to determine.1 1
Although some Congressional grants of standing such as those found
in the Clean Air Act 22 explicitly confer citizen standing and the public
interest suits arising therefrom are not met with any standing hindrances
by the Court,123 others confer standing to a more vague category of persons often described as "injured" or "aggrieved" without the inclusion of
112

Tushnet, supra note 8, at 670.

Such statutory standing may extend to actions by "private attorneys-general"
against private parties or to those against the government itself.
114 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193 (1974).
1"

15 392 U.S. at 132.

11 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196 n.18 (Powell, J., concurring), quoting
Harlan, J., dissenting in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 130.
117 See Association of Data Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155 (1970).
"' Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
119 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943).
120 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
1"1 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972). See also Berger, supra note
108, at 837 et seq.; Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1044.
122 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7402 (1977).
113 See Sedler, supra note 108, at 884.
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a definition of these terms. The latter type of statutory standing is illustrated by section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 124 In judicial
review of administrative action, prospective litigants who are not expressly authorized by the former type of statute to challenge action taken
pursuant thereto would invoke section 10 which provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.2 5
Because of the inherent ambiguity in the amorphous wording of such
general grants of standing, the Court has for the most part construed
them so as to require the satisfaction of the same constitutional tests
which have been invoked in non-statutory suits in which standing has
been in issue. Therefore, it is appropriate to continue our consideration of
the dynamics of the rules of standing as they have developed in cases
arising from both statutory and non-statutory situations.
C. In the Wake of Flast
Although Flast concerned a litigant whose standing was contingent
upon her status as taxpayer, 12 the pronouncements regarding standing
had a sweeping effect upon all areas of public interest law. In the intervening years between the decision itself and the subsequent application
of its principles to other actual taxpayer suits, 1 27 the Court extended and
amplified the Flast holding in a variety of public interest suits.
The Flast constitutionalization of the standing requirements was applied in two 1970 companion cases, Association of Data Processing Service OrganizationsInc. v. Camp 28 and Barlow v. Collins,1 29 as the first
arm of a stricter two-fold test of standing. In these cases, the Court required the plaintiff to first of all satisfy the article III case or controversy
requirement by establishing a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. The Court indicated that this could be accomplished by the alle124 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act of 1970, §10, 5 U.S.C. §702 (1976). Judicial
review of administrative action constitutes a major portion of the federal case load. See
Comment, State Standing to ChallengeFederal Administrative Action: A Re-examination
of the ParensPatriaeDoctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1094 (1977). As early as 1954, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter noted that "review of administrative action, mainly reflecting enforcement of federal regulatory statutes, constitutes the largest category of the Court's work,
comprising one-third of the total cases decided on the merits." Frankfurter, The Supreme
Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793 (1957).
:" Administrative Procedure Act of 1970, §10, 5 U.S.C. §702 (1976).

1:4 392 U.S. at 84, 102.
17 See, e.g., U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
12 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
121 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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gation of "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."' 130 Secondly, the Court
required that the specific interest to which injury is alleged be arguably
within the "zone of interests" protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question. 1 31 This second arm of the test,
though clearly unrelated to the constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of the Court, may exhibit an inclination on the part of the Court to
"go the extra mile" in imposing its own rules of self-restraint. Yet curiously enough, in spite of the articulation and application of the more intricate two-fold test, the ultimate effect of both Barlow and Camp was to
relax the standing requirements. First of all, the Court in Camp firmly
and finally rejected the notion that the interest to which injury is alleged
must be a "legal interest.' 3 2 Secondly, the Court suggested that in the
allegation of a specific interest which is to be arguably within the proper
"zone of interests," an interest which reflects not only economical but
"aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" values would be sufficient.' 3 3
Because both Camp and Barlow were cases in which the "palpable
economic injury"'' of the litigants was involved, however, the Court did
not address itself to the question of what must be alleged by persons
claiming an injury of a noneconomic nature to interests that are widely
shared. This question was addressed two years later in Sierra Club v.
Morton' 5 where the assertion of an adverse effect upon the aesthetics
and ecology of an area was held to amount to an "injury in fact" sufficient
to establish standing under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 3 Mr. Justice Stewart, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Sierra Club, expressly acknowledged that values may be asserted by individuals before a court, notwithstanding the fact that they may be held in
common with the general public.'3 7 All that is required is that in attempting to satisfy the "injury in fact" test, the litigants assert specific injury
to themselves. 8
Standing was denied to the Sierra Club because of its failure to allege
in the pleadings that its members actually used the recreational area it
130 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 152.
131See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 130-33 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Such statutory
standing may extend to actions by "private attorneys-general" against private parties or to
those against the government itself. See FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,
477 (1941); Note, Standing and the Propriety of JudicialIntervention Reviving a Traditional Approach, 52 Nom DAam LAW. 944, 946 (1977).
132 397 U.S. at 153-54. Compare Tennessee Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
133 397 U.S. at 153-54.
134 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
135 Id.
1365 U.S.C. §702 (1976).
137 405 U.S. at 734. According to Justice Stewart, "[a]esthetic and environmental wellbeing ...
are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that
particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not
make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process." Id.
18 Id.
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was seeking to protect much less that they used it in any way which
would be "significantly affected" by the proposed development. 1 9 An
amendment to the pleadings easily overcame this omission, however, and
by the defendants to dismiss the amended coma subsequent motion
140
plaint was denied.
The inhibitory notions which have been so often used by the Court to
deny standing are also apparent in Sierra Club, but they are overshadowed by the Court's expressed concern in respect of environmental
141
protection.
The notion of separation of powers as an inhibition to standing did
not appear to be of great influence on the Court, notwithstanding the
vehement argument of the Solicitor General in which separation of powers was propounded as an enshrined constitutional doctrine.242 The majority opinion of the Court did not even respond to the separation of powers argument of the Solicitor General other than to acknowledge that
while the requirement of allegation of "injury in fact" restricts judicial
outcome,
review to suits raised by those who have a direct stake in their
48
review."'
judicial
from
action
executive
insulate
not
it "does
The article I[I case or controversy limitation would appear to be
somewhat less stringent in cases such as Sierra Club in which the standing asserted has a statutory basis." Nevertheless, the Court saw the adversary nature of proceedings as partly assured by the requirement that
the party seeking review allege injury in fact. The effect of such a requirement is to "put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the
hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome."" This is presumably a reference to Flast, where a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy was held to be essential to ensure that "the dispute
and in
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context
46
a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.'
The Court in Sierra Club also includes a footnote reference to an
observation made by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830's concerning the
effectiveness of the approach of the Court in preventing limitless attack
upon legislation:
By leaving it to private interest to censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the law with the trial of an individual, legislaat 735.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The motion to dismiss
was actually urged on grounds unrelated to standing. See also Sedler, supra note 108, at
:31Id.
140

865.

405 U.S. at 734.
Id. at 753-55 (Appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 740.
144 The action was brought under the umbrella provision of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §702 (1976).
145 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 740.
141

4I

''

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 101.
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tion is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of
party spirit. The errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a real
want; and it is always a positive
and appreciable fact that must serve as
14 7
the basis of a prosecution.
In regard to the floodgates inhibition, the Court, in its refusal to recognize the standing of the Sierra Club based on merely its "bona-fide special interest," is implicit in its desire to prevent judicial review "at the
behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process." 148 The Solicitor General expressed a horror of the multiplicity of proceedings which
14
he felt would flood the Court if standing were accorded to the plaintiff. '
Mr. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, would have permitted an "imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing"150 in order to
enable such organizations as the Sierra Club to litigate environmental issues. He devised a test whereby the standing of an organizational plaintiff
would only be recognized if the asserted interest was of one with a "provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status.' 52 Justice Blackmun considered the floodgates fear and reassuringly stated that the Court "need
not fear that Pandora's Box will be opened or that there will be no limit
to the number of those who desire to participate in environmental litigation. The courts will exercise appropriate restraints just as they have exercised them in the past."152
D.

Standing for Inanimate Objects

The dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas fashioned a rather avant
garde notion of standing which he believed should be brought to bear in
the adjudication of environmental issues.158 He would have allowed environmental issues to be litigated before the Court "in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage.'"
Douglas responded to the separation of powers issue posed by the
Solicitor General by noting that the governmental agencies which are in147 Quoted in 405 U.S. at 740 n.16. The Court also referred to de Tocqueville's more
famous observation that "[s]carcely any political question arises in the United States that is
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." Quoted in id.
148 Id. at 740.
149 Id. at 753-55 (Appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

251
Id.
152 Id.

at 758.

Id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For further discussion of Justice Douglas' treatment of the concept of standing, see Mendelson, Mr. Justice Douglas and Government by
the Judiciary, 38 J. POL. 918, 921-23 (1976); and Goldman, In Defense of Justice: Some
Thoughts on Reading ProfessorMendelson's "Mr.Justice Douglas and Government by the
Judiciary",39 J. POL. 148, 152-53 (1977).
1 405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11
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stituted to protect the 'public interest' are often "notoriously under the
control of powerful interests who manipulate them,"1 5 and "unduly oriented toward the interests of the industry it is designed to regulate,
rather than the public interest it is designed to protect."158 The argument
put forth by the Solicitor General that judicial review of administrative
action is made unnecessary by the continuous and effective scrutiny of
governmental agencies by Congress 57 was refuted by Douglas in his assertion that "even Congress is too remote to give meaningful direction and
its machinery is too ponderous to use very often."'158
E.

OrganizationalPlaintiffs

The denial of standing to the plaintiff in Sierra Club for its failure to
allege injury to its members was to some extent based upon the general
principle against the assertion of third party rights. Justice Stewart inferred from the plaintiff organizations' failure to allege such injury that it
must have "regarded any allegations of individualized injury as superfluous, on the theory that this was a 'public' action involving questions as to
the use of natural resources, and that the Club's long-standing concern
with and expertise in such matters were sufficient to give it standing as a
'representative of public.' ",i' After stating that such a stance indicates a
basic misunderstanding about the law concerning 'public actions,' Stewart
explicated the relevant case law and proceeded to derive therefrom an
articulate rule of standing for organizational plaintiffs:
It is clear than an organization whose members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review . . .But a
mere "interest in a problem," no matter how longstanding the interest
and no matter how qualified.the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of the APA.' 60
According to Stewart, once an organizational plaintiff has properly
alleged "injury in fact" of some or all of its members, standing is established and the plaintiff may then "assert the interests of the general public in support of his claims for equitable relief."' 6' In other words, a litigant, whether organizational or individual, may properly represent the
public interest only if the prerequisite of standing has first been satisfied
by the allegation of "injury in fact." Stewart recognized the trend of the
Il Id. at 745.

156 Id. at 747. See also Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
157Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 753-55 (Appendix to opinion of Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
158Id. at 745 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 736 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
,5,
1" Id. at 739.

161Id. at 740 n.15.
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Administrative Procedure Act cases towards the broadening of the categories of injury, but he drew a firm distinction between this and the actual abandonment of the requirement of allegation of injury.
F. Jus Tertii - Assertion of Rights of Third Parties
The general principle that a litigant may not assert the constitutional
or legislatively protected rights of third parties - jus tertii - has arisen
as a rule of jucicial restraint. This development has been influenced by
the inhibitory belief that "the assertion of rights not personal to the
plaintiff prevents the framing of issues with sufficient adverseness.' 16 2 According to the Court in Craig v. Boren, 11s this prohibitory principle is not
constitutionally mandated, but rather stems from a "salutary rule of selfrestraint designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where applicabe constitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative." ' " Because this principle has ostensibly arisen without constitutional mandate, it has been possible for the Court to allow for certain
exceptions in the area of public interest law. Indeed, the relaxation of the
principle by the Court in recent years has led one commentator to declare
that "the Court has allowed so many exceptions to its rule ... that the
rule seems honoured only in the breach," and that these numerous exceptions "lack a coherent pattern and leave the significance of the rule in
doubt."" 5
Several Supreme Court cases which state the general principle
against the assertion of jus tertii, only to allow an exception thereto,
merit examination at this point. In Barrows v. Jackson,166 a white defendant was sued for breach of a restrictive covenant which discriminated
against blacks. Notwithstanding the general rule against the vicarious assertion of constitutional rights, the Court permitted the defendant to assert the equal protection rights of unidentified third party blacks.' 70 The
Court considered this relaxation of the rule to be justified by the fact that
"it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are
asserted to present their grievances before any court."'168
The inability of a third party to assert his own rights was also found
to be a ground for exception to the general rule in the 1958 case of
NAACP v. Alabama.169 In an action to oust the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People from the State of Alabama, the State
"I See Schaffner, supra note 29, at 950.

161 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
16 Id. at 193.

Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423, 423-24
(1974).
1" 346 U.S. 249 (1953).

Id. at 255-59.
I" Id. at 257.
167

169

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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had obtained a court order requiring the Association to produce membership lists. Their refusal to comply resulted in a judgement of contempt, in
response to which the Association petitioned to the Supreme Court for
certiorari.1 70 The Court reversed the judgement of contempt, holding
that, because the members and the NAACP were "in every practical
sense indentical" and because disclosure of the members identity would
destroy their constitutional right to freedom of association, the NAACP
was the appropriate party to vindicate that right."'
In Griswold v. Connecticut," the executive and medical directors of
a family planning association were charged under an anti-birth control
statute with the offense of abetment. They were permitted standing to
assert the constitutional right to privacy of married persons with whom
they had a professional relationship of a "cofifidential" nature.1 73 Eisen74
also emphasized the nature of the relationship between
stadt v. Baird1
the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert. In that case, a proponent of planned parenthood was convicted under a Massachusetts statute for unlawfully distributing contraceptive articles to unmarried persons.17 5 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that although he was not a
physician or a pharmacist or an unmarried person, the appellee had
standing to assert the equal protection rights of unmarried persons who
were denied access to contraceptives.17
The appellee's standing in Eisenstadt was in part based upon the
fact that his relationship to the unmarried persons whose rights he sought
to assert was essentially as between "one who acted to protect the rights
of a minority and the minority itself." 7 Moreover, the Court's grant of
jus tertii standing was based upon its determination of the impact of the
legislation on third party interests and upon the fact that the third parties themselves had no forum in which to assert their own rights.17 8
Although this latter notion was also acknowledged as a basis for exception in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,179 the Court there emphasized the significance of the basic rule against the vicarious assertion of rights. This
inhibitory rule "reflect[s] the conviction that under our constitutional
system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on
the validity of the Nation's laws."1 80 The Court also indicated that excep170 Id. at 454.

Id. at 459.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173 Id. at 481.
174 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
175 Id. at 440.
174 Id. at 446.
177 Id. at 445.
178 Unmarried persons are not themselves subject to prosecution under the anti-birth
control statute, which prohibited the distribution, not the use, of contraceptives. Id. at 446.
171 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
171

172

1SOId. at 610-11.
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tions are to be recognized only in situations involving the most "weighty
countervailing policies." 181
In Singleton v. Wulff,18 a case which involved delicate policy issues,18 s the Court clearly outlined two factual elements which justified a
departure from the general rule. Firstly, the existence of a relationship
between the litigant and the persons whose rights he seeks to assert is
relevant to the Court's determination on jus tertii standing if the enjoyment of those rights is "inextricably bound up with the activity which the
litigant seeks to pursue." 1" The litigants in Singleton were physicians
who sought to assert the jus tertii rights of their female patients in a
challenge to the constitutionality of a Missouri statute which deprived
needy persons of Medicaid benefits for non-medically indicated
abortions.81 5
The second relevant factual element in Singleton was the ability of
the third party to assert his own rights. Finding firstly that the requisite
closeness was patent in the doctor-patient relationship and, secondly,
that because of emotional and practical obstacles, the women's assertion
of their own rights was inhibited, the Court permitted the litigants to
vicariously assert the rights of their patients.188 It is important to note,
however, that the litigants in Singleton were in a position to be able to
allege a sufficiently concrete interest of their own - an economical interest
- in the outcome of the suit to establish the constitutional requirements
of article I. Without such an allegation, it is likely that a threshold determination regarding the standing of the litigants would not have been
made in their favour.
The bifurcated exception set forth in Singleton was amplified in the
decision of Craig v. Boren,187 wherein the Court permitted a female licensed vendor of beer to assert the equal protection rights of males 18 to
20 years of age in her challenge to an Oklahoma statute which prohibited
the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of
18.288 As in Singleton, the litigant was independently able to establish her
"I1Id. at 611. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). In Broadrick, the Court
considered the infringement of First Amendment rights to present such a situation.
182 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
2" The Court approved and applied the distinctions articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1972), all of which emphasized the nature of the third party litigant
relationship.
184 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 114.
185 Id. at 109.
188 Id. at 117. The

Court noted that a woman "may be chilled from such assertion by a
desire to protect the very privacy of her decisions from the publicity of a Court suit." Id.
The more practical obstacle to such assertion was the problem of "imminent mootness", i.e.
only a few months after a woman makes a decision to abort, she will lose her right to do so
by the very lapse of time which would inevitably elapse in the course of a court action. Id.
187 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
I" Id. at 192-93.
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standing, for the impugned statute allegedly inflicted "injury in fact"
upon her sufficient to guarantee "concrete adverseness" and to satisfy the
requirements of article rnI. 89 The Court permitted the assertion of the
"concomitant rights" of the third parties in the challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, holding that these rights "would be diluted or
adversely affected should the constitutional challenge fail and the statute
remain in force." 1 0
In Warth v. Seldin,19" the Court applied the Sierra Club reasoning
regarding representational standing. The Court held that even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the
representative of its members, but only if it first alleges that some or all
of its members "are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result
of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case
had the members themselves brought suit," and only if the individual
participation of each injured member would not be indispensible to a
proper judicial resolution of the action. 192 The Court also declared that an
association may, in alleging injury to itself, assert the rights of its members if their associational ties are adversely affected by the impugned action.193 Furthermore, the nature of the relief sought was indicated by the
Court to be a relevant consideration in the determination of the standing
of a representative plaintiff. That is to say, the Court will be highly influenced by the extent to which the relief sought will arguably inure to the
benefit of the members of the association who are actually injured.
The Warth exception to the rule against jus tertii9" was approved
and amplified in a subsequent 1977 decision, Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Commission,"'"where it was held by the Court that an association has standing to vindicate the rights of its members when:
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.191
,81Id. at 194.
190 Id. at 195.

Is-422 U.S. 490 (1975). See text accompanying notes 237-49, infra.
112 422 U.S. at 511. The Court also held that there was "no doubt that an association
may have standing in its own right to seek judicial review from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy." Id.
1 Id.

Id. at 511. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), which,
in considering the Warth exception, found that the plaintiff organization did not have representational standing as it had been unable to assert either injury to itself or "actual injury" to any of its members.
19

115

432 U.S. 333 (1977).

'"Id. at 343. In Hunt, the WAAC was actually attempting to assert the rights of persons who were not actually "members" of the Commission in the traditional sense. The
Court nevertheless granted representational standing on the finding that these persons possessed all the "indicia" of membership in an organization and that, in any event, the Coin-
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G. A Re-examination of Standing by the Burger Court
The general approach of the Court to the concept of standing in the
several years following the Flast decision demonstrated a willingness to
facilitate judicial access for private litigants who were seeking to vindicate
public rights. These years have been referred to as the Warren Court's
"activist" years. 197 While the Court continued to apply the constitutional
"personal stake" test, which required the establishment of either "logical
nexus" or "injury in fact,"1 8 some cases extended "logical nexus" to a
mere connection between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated' " and others stretched "injury in fact" to include abstract
allegations beyond substantiation.'0 In 1971, a Federal Court of Appeals
judge commented that "the Supreme Court's recent decisions have made
the standing obstacle to judicial review a shadow of its former self,
and
20 1
have for all practical purposes deprived it of meaningful vitality.
The more recent trend, however, has become one of restraint. The
present Burger Court has restrictively redefined standing to the extent
that non-traditional litigants seeking to assert the public interest are virtually barred from the courts. The juncture to which this reversal of
trends is likely attributable was the fresh consideration by the Court of
the notion of taxpayer or citizen standing per se in two 1974 companion
cases involving highly controversial issues of public policy, United States
v. Richardson202 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
2 03
War.
In United States v. Richardson, a federal taxpayer insituted an action to challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Central
Intelligency Agency Act 2 " which concern the public reporting of expenditures. He alleged that the withholding of such information as provided for
mission itself stood to be adversely affected financially by the outcome of the litigation,
thereby establishing the "personal stake" requirement. Id. at 344-45.
1"Note, Standing and the Propriety of JudicialIntervention Reviving a Traditional

Approach, supra note 131, at 945.
198 See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
200See, e.g., United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where standing was ac-

corded to users of a recreational area challenging an Interstate Commerce Commission order
which permitted railroads to impose a surcharge on freight rates for certain items including,
among other things, recycable materials. The plaintiffs had alleged that the surcharge would
increase the use of nonrecyclable commodities, leading in turn to a greater use of virgin

materials and to a disruption in their use of the forests, streams and other resources in a
certain area for camping, fishing, hiking and sightseeing. Id. at 678. It was held by the Court
that the fact that many persons share the same injury was not sufficient reason to deny
standing. Id. at 686-87.
201 National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 693 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
202
203

20"

418 U.S. 166 (1974).
418 U.S. 208 (1974).
50 U.S.C. §403a et seq. (1976).
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by the legislation constituted
a violation of the Statement and Account
205
Clause of the Constitution.

The RichardsonCourt was forced to acknowledge the Flast modification of the Frothingham doctrine, but it applied the same in a fashion
which strictly limited its purview so as to effectively preclude the Richardson action and any future taxpayer suits which did not precisely fit
into the Flast situation. The logical nexus test, the satisfaction of which
had imputed standing to the taxpayer/plaintiff in Flast, was held by the
Richardson Court to be applicable only to challenges addressed to the
taxing or spending power of Congress under article I, section 8 of the
Constitution and to challenges which allege a violation of a specific
constitutional limitation upon the said power. 20 6 The plaintiffs did not
directly attack the exercise of the taxing and spending power,2 07 and
thus were unable to allege the appropriate nexus. As a result, they were
seen by the Court as "improperly seeking to employ a federal court as a
forum in which to air... generalized grievances about the conduct of
20 8
government."

To invoke judicial powers of review, the Court in Richardsonheld it
necessary for the prospective plaintiff to meet the Flast personal stake
prerequisite by the satisfaction of the logical nexus test or, in the alternative, by the allegation of "injury in fact" in the sense of a "direct, concrete injury."209 As the Richardson plaintiff was alleging what the Court
saw as a mere "abstract injury" and were essentially seeking to advocate a
general interest common to all citizens, they were found
not to have satis210
fied the personal stake test for case or controversy.
The inhibitory notion of separation of powers was most prevalent in
the Richardson decision. In delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice
Burger exhibited a judicial unwillingness to adjudicate a claim which involved a potential collision between the judiciary and the other two
205 418 U.S. at 167-68. U. S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 7 provides: "No money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time."
21"

418 U.S. at 175.

As pointed out by Douglas in his dissent, a taxpayer cannot possibly challenge the
exercise of the taxing and spending power unless he knows how the money is being spent.
He cannot possibly know how the money is being spent unless there is a public reporting of
expenditures as provided for by the Statement and Account Clause. By confining standing
to a narrowly applied logical nexus test, the Court has thereby created a "Cath-22" situation. Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell, while concurring with the majority opinion, indicates that he would obliterate the Flast nexus test, for it "has no meaningful connection with the Court's statement of the bare-minimum constitutional requirements for standing." Id. at 181 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
1o Id. at 173 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
207

209

Id. at 175, 179-80.

210 Id. at 176-80.
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branches of government. Burger saw the interests which serve to motivate
such a claim as best vindicated in the political forum or at the polls. In
stressing that the U.S. Constitution created a representative and responsible government, Burger asserted that lack of standing does not impair
the right of a citizen to make known his views. He acknowledged the fact
that the traditional electoral process may seem to be "[s]low, cumbersome, and unresponsive" and that the trend has therefore been for citizens to increasingly request judicial intervention, but insisted nevertheless that the American governmental system provides for citizen
complaint by facilitating the replacement of one government by another
at the behest of the majority of the electorate. 211
The concurring opinion of Justice Powell echoed the same separation
of powers concerns. In his words, "[r]elaxation of standing requirements
is directly related to the expansion of judicial power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift
away from a democratic form of government. ' 21 2 He feared that such unrestrained standing would lead to a system of judicial supervision of the
co-ordinate branches of government similar in kind to the proposed
Council of Revision which was repeatedly rejected by the framers of the
213
Constitution.
In addition, Powell was concerned about the burden upon the limited
resources of the Court which would only be exacerbated by the diversion
of the Court's attention "from [its] historical role to the resolution of the
Court's public interest suits. 21 4 He noted "how often and how unequivocally the Court has expressed its antipathy to efforts to convert the judiciary into an open forum for the resolution of political or ideological dis2 15
putes about the performance of government.
Richardson's companion case, Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee
to Stop the War, 21 6 was also an attempt by citizens to advocate the public
211

Id. at 179.

212 Id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
212 Id. at 189. The Council of Revision was part of the plan for the Constitution pro-

posed by Governor Randolph of Virginia. According to the Randolph Plan:
The Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of Revision with authority to examine every act of the National
Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a
Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall
amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed,
or that a particular Legislature be again negatived by 5 rules of the members of
each branch.
Reprinted in 1 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 61
(L.H. Pollak ed. 1966).
214 418 U.S. at 192.
215 Id.; see, e.g., Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham), 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923).
21" 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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interest per se without alleging jnjury beyond that suffered by all other
citizens and taxpayers. A group of anti-war citizens and taxpayers
brought suit to challenge a governmental policy, which permitted members of Congress to hold positions in the Armed Forces Reserves, as being
an unconstitutional violation of article I, section 6, clause 2, which provides that no person "holding any Office under the United States" shall
be a member of Congress during his continuance of such office. 217 The
complaint alleged injury "to the ability of the average citizen to make his
political advocacy effective whenever it touches on the vast interests of
the Pentagon.
"' 21 8 The Court in Schlesinger viewed the alleged injury as
abstract in nature, referable only to a "generalized interest of all citizens
in constitutional government," an insufficient basis for standing.2119 This
was clearly expressed by Chief Justice Burger, in speaking for the
majority:
To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a court to
rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract would create the
potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the
Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing "government by
220
injunction.
The three inhibitory notions which have served to restrain judicial
intervention into public interest controversies plainly influenced the
Court in its denial of standing. As in Richardson, the Court in Schlesinger felt confident in being able to avoid the adverse consequences of
ignoring these inhibitions only by the strict requirement of allegation of
concrete injury. Ostensibly, the separation of powers doctrine and the adversarial proceedings limitation would not be flouted, nor would the floodgates fear be disregarded if all prospective litigants were required to justify their standing by establishing that they have suffered direct, concrete
injury.
In expressing the hesitancy of the Court to undertake any constitutional adjudication, Burger indicated that the practical effect of judicial
intervention in Schlesinger would be to bring about a "confrontation with
one of the coordinate branches of the Government. '221 He believed that
the requirement of concrete injury serves the proper function of "insuring
'222
that [constitutional] adjudication does not take place unnecessarily.
Although Burger acknowledged that all citizens share an equal interest in
the independence of each branch of government, he viewed such an interest as being "too abstract to constitute a 'case or controversy' appropriate
Id. at 210-11; U.S. CONST. art. I, §6, cl. 2.
218 418 U.S. at 233 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
217

211Id.
220
221

222

at 227 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).

Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 221.
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for judicial resolution."223
As in Richardson, the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement of personal stake, as articulated by Flast, was restrictively applied
in Schlesinger. According to Burger, this requirement may be met either
by the satisfaction of the Flast logical nexus test or by the allegation of
direct, concrete injury. The nexus test was found not to be satisfied by
the Schlesinger plaintiffs as no challenge to Congress' taxing and spend224
ing power was made.
A personal stake constituted by concrete injury is described by Burger in Schlesinger as an "indispensable element" in the type of dispute
traditionally seen as capable of judicial resolution.225 Burger espoused the
belief that only such a personal stake on the part of the complainant will
assure a full and authoritative presentation to the Court of the adverse
consequences flowing from the challenged action:
Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial process, for a Court must rely on the parties' 2treatment of the facts and
claims before it to develop its rules of law.
The Schlesinger Court seemed generally disinclined to make a constitutional ruling on what it considered abstract issues which would, by
res judicata, effectively preclude prospective plaintiffs from present issues arising out of concrete injury. If only those persons directly so injured are permitted to broach relevant issues for judicial consideration,
the res judicata effect will likely be more limited:
the discrete factual context within which the concrete injury occurred or
is threatened insures the framing of relief no broader than required by
the precise facts to which the court's ruling would be applied. 2 7
The motivation of the complainants, no matter how bona fide, was
seen by the Court as an improper substitute for "injury in fact." In fact,
the "essence" of standing was held to be "not a question of motivation
but of the requisite. . . interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by
22
the unconstitutional conduct.1 8
223Id.

22"Id. at 228.
225Id.

at 220-21.
Id. at 221.
227 Id. at 222. But see Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1034, who suggests that a widespread
desire for a broad judicial pronouncement is not irrelevant to the definition of the judicial
function.
218Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 225-26; In the words
of Chief Justice Burger:
actual injury [is] needed by the courts and adversaries to focus litigation efforts
226

and judicial decisionmaking. Moreover, the evaluation of the quality of the pres-

entation on the merits was a retrospective judgment that could properly have
been arrived at only after standing had been found so as to permit the court to
consider the merits. A logical corollary to this approach would be the manifestly
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The floodgates fear was placated in Shclesinger not merely by the
denial of standing, but by the inclusion by the Court of the following
statement, which is exemplary of the perfunctory mention usually made
of the limited resources of the Court:
The powers of the federal judiciary will be adequate for great burdens
placed upon them only if they are employed prudently, with recognition
of the strengths as well as the hazards that go with our kind of representative government. 29
Although it was implicit in the Flast decision that taxpayers or citizens seeking to obtain judicial review of a justiciable constitutional question should be granted standing when no other plaintiffs are available,
Burger clearly is not in favour of such an approach. In Schlesinger, he
asserted that the American system of government has left certain crucial
decisions to the other branches of government and that a plaintiff should
not be found to have standing simply because the effect of denying standing to the plaintiff might be to preclude any other plaintiffs from litigating the same issue. In Richardson, he argued that the absence of any
plaintiff other than a citizen or taxpayer to challenge impugned action is
indicative of the political nature of the issue and hence the impropriety of
23 0
judicial intervention.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Marshall in Schlesinger do not disagree so much with the adoption of interpretation of
"personal stake" as requiring direct, concrete injury as with the characterization of the plaintiffs' alleged injury as abstract. Marshall described
the plaintiffs' complaint as "a claim of direct and concrete injury to a
judicially cognizable interest."2'3 Douglas asserted that a fundamental
tenet of the American democratic system decrees that "the people, not
the bureaucracy, are the sovereign. 28 2 Consequently, he considered that
the interest of citizens in having the Constitution enforced as it is written
is a basic right. The abrogation of this right, said Douglas, is more than a
generalized grievance, even though the resultant injury is common to all
238
citizens.
untenable view that the inadequacy of the presentation on the merits would be an
appropriate basis for denying standing.
Id. at 226. See also Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).

"1 418 U.S. at 222, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
230 See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 692.
221

418 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

131 Id. at 232 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 232-33. According to Justice Douglas:
The interest of citizens is obvious. The complaint alleges injuries to the ability of
the average citizen to make his political advocacy effective whenever it touches on
the vast interests of the Pentagon. It is said that all who oppose the expansion of
military influence in our national affairs find they are met with a powerful

lobby-the Reserve Officers Association-which has strong congressional allies.
Id. at 233.
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Douglas referred to the statement in S.C.R.A.P.23 4 that "standing is

not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury. "235
The floodgates fear was diminished in Douglas' eyes by what he saw as
the odiousness of a "no other plaintiff" consequence: "To deny standing
to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also
injured, would mean that the most injurious
and widespread Government
23 6
actions could be questioned by nobody."

The Court made the standing prerequisites even more stringent in
two subsequent public interest actions, Warth v. Seldin23 7 and Simon v.
238
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.
In Warth, a suit was
brought on behalf of minority and low income persons challenging the
constitutionality of a suburban town's zoning ordinance which allegedly
was enacted to exclude such persons from living within its perimeters. 239
It was held by the Court, inter alia, that the plaintiffs did not have
standing since they had not adequately indicated in their pleadings that
the allegedly unconstitutional zoning ordinance had demonstrably caused
their exclusion from residence in the town.2 0 In embarking upon a line of
causation analysis, the Court observed that while the zoning ordinance
may have acted to increase the cost of housing within the town, the inability of the plaintiffs to find housing was the consequence of the economics of the area housing market rather than of the allegedly unconsti241

tutional ordinance.

Notwithstanding its assertion that a resolution as to standing must
be a threshold determinant which should not depend upon the merits of
the complaint, the Court in Warth actually engaged in a premature examination of the merits by analysing the lines of causation between the
injury alleged and the action complained of.
In its discussion of the question of standing, the Court recognized
that judicial intervention can be inhibited by both constitutional limitations on Court jurisdiction and "prudential limitations on its exercise."124'
The underlying concern for both inhibitions was the desire to maintain
the "proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic
'" United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
235 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 235 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
23I Id. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, saw no inconsistency with S.C.R.A.P.
in the denial of standing to the plaintiffs. He explained that standing was denied not because the alleged injury had been suffered by many but rather because "the sort of direct
palpable injury required for standing under Article IIr' had not been alleged. Id. at 229
(Stewart, J., concurring).
237 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
-- 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
:39 422 U.S. at 493.
240 Id. at 508.
2. Id. at 506.

242

Id. at 498.
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society. '24 3
In Simon v. EKWRO, 244 the Court further indicated its intention to
look partially into the merits of a claim to determine standing by requiring the establishment by the complainant of injury that "fairly can be
traced to the challenged action of the defendant. '245 The plaintiff organizations in Simon were challenging an Internal Revenue Service ruling
which made it financially practicable for nonprofit
hospitals to avoid pro46
viding health care for low income persons.
Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing not just because of the failure to allege a causal link between the asserted injury and action of the defendants, but because their
claim did not indicate that the prospective relief would alleviate the
harm.24 7 This latter notion was also apparent in the Warth decision when
the Court suggested that in a proper case the remedy, if granted, should
24 8
inure to the benefit of those actually injured.
According to earlier characterizations by the Court of the standing
concept, one would think that such considerations, especially a causal link
analysis, belong more properly to a determination by the Court of the
merits. The Court repeatedly has asserted that standing is a threshold
determinant, that standing focuses on the party and not the issues, and
that standing is only one aspect of justiciability. Yet the Court appeared
in cases such as Warth and Simon to be avoiding its own directives by
leaping over, the threshold of the door of the Court for a premature perusal of the merits. Such judicial behavior leads to the conjecture that the
Court is manipulating the standing determinant as a surrogate for a decision on the merits when, for whatever reason, the Court wishes to disguise
24
such a decision. 9
III. THE CONCEPT OF STANDING As APPLIED By THE CANADIAN COURT
The treatment of the concept of standing by Canadian courts, until
very recently, has closely paralleled American trends. This parallel treatment is surprising in light of fundamental constitutional distinctions in
regard to the function of the judiciary. Canadian courts are unhampered
243

Id.

244 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgs., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
245Id. at 41 (opinion of Powell, J.).
246 Id. at 32-33.
247 Id. at 45-46.
24

See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252

(1977), where the Court accorded standing to an organizational plaintiff challenging the zoning policies of the defendant village. Unlike the organizational plaintiff in Warth, however,
the plaintiff in Arlington Heights was able to allege specific injury that was "fairly traceable
to the defendant's acts or ommissions." Id. at 261. The plaintiff's planned housing development was cancelled by the defendant village's refusal to rezone a single-family dwelling area.
Id. at 254.
249 See generally, Tushnet, supra note 8, at 663-64, 699-700.
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by such constitutional constraints as the "case or controversy" requirements of article III of the United States Constitution 250 and therefore any
inhibitory notions of separation of powers or adversarial proceedings have
no doctrinal basis. Moreover, what would be perceived by American constitutional lawyers as non-judicial advisory functions have long been seen
as being within the proper territory of the Supreme Court of Canada in
its consideration of references.251 Yet, notwithstanding this relative freedom from constitutional restraint, the tendency of the Court in public
interest suits, until recently, 252 has been to restrict standing to those litigants who have properly asserted an interest or an injury peculiar to
themselves.
The Canadian Court, like its American counterpart, tends to manipulate standing as a gauge for the consideration of the appropriateness of
judicial intervention and in so doing tends to apply the same inhibitory
notions discussed above. In the absence of constitutional limitations upon
the function of the Court, however, there is no absolute preclusion from
intervention and therefore the inhibitory notions regarding the role and
the power of the Court are less predominant. It is the third inhibition, the
floodgates fear, which is the most pervasive concern.
2 53
In Smith v. Attorney-General of Ontario,
the first definitive Canadian pronouncement on the question of standing, this concern about the
multiplicity of proceedings predominated the reasoning of the Court in its
decision to deny standing.'
25
As in Frothingham,
" the prospective plaintiff in Smith attacked a
regulatory piece of legislation, grounding his standing on the assertion of
his status as taxpayer. The facts of the case disclose that at a time when
the importation of liquor into Ontario was prohibited, Smith, a resident
of the province, attempted to place an order for a certain quantity of
alcoholic beverages from a dealer in another province. Aware of the fact
that the Canada Temperance Act prohibited such importation into Ontario, the dealer declined to accept the order. Smith commenced his action
against the Attorney-General of Ontario, seeking a declaratory judgement
to effect that the prohibitory statute did not validly apply in his provart. HI, §2, cl. 1.
"I The reference is a device whereby the legislative branch of the government can refer
questions of law to the Court for an advisory opinion. While not specifically restricted to the
consideration of constitutional issues, this has been the predominant use of the reference
procedure. In fact, the reference procedure has been the device utilized to bring to court
approximately one-third of all Canadian constitutional cases. See G. STRAYER, supra note
21, at 111-23.
252 In the exercise of what has been described as "creative decision-making," the Court
articulated standing requirements which appeared to liberalize the former treatment of the
concept. See Thorson v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 43 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1974).
250 U.S. CONST.

255 [1924] 3 D.L.R. 189 (Can.).
25 Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham),

262 U.S. 447 (1923). It is interesting to
note that Smith was decided just one year after Frothinghamand that both cases stood for
over 45 years as effective barriers to the standing of public interest litigants.
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ince.' 55 He attempted to base his standing on the fact that the effect of
the statute was to debar him from exercising his right to bring liquor into
the province and that he should not have to place himself in the intolerable position of subjecting himself to criminal prosecution in order to challenge legislation which so affected him.25
Smith based this argument on the decision of the English Court of
57 In Dyson, the plaintiff also
Appeal in Dyson v. Attorney-General.2
sought to challenge illegal governmental action without putting himself
first in the vulnerable position of prosecution. The Court decided to hear
the plaintiff on his complaint, notwithstanding the fact that he had not
suffered any particular injury and did not wish to assert any particular
interest beyond that of the public in general. Lord Justice FletcherMoulton asserted in Dyson that the English judicial system "would never
permit a plaintiff to be 'driven from the judgement seat'. . . without any
Court having considered his right to be heard, excepting in cases where
the cause of action was obviously and almost incontestably bad.' ' 5 Similar sentiment was expressed by Lord Justice Farwell who declared: "it
would be a blot on our system of law and procedure if there is no way by
which a decision on the true limit of the power in question can be obtained by any member of the public aggrieved, without putting himself in
the invidious position of being sued for a penalty."' 5 9
Although the Court in Smith appeared to be moved by the plaintiff's
argument that he should not have to subject himself to criminal prosecution in order to challenge legislation which directly affected him, it was
more concerned about the "grave inconvenience" which could result from
the recognition of a principle which would allow virtual "citizen standing." 0 In the words of Justice Duff:
Much may be said no doubt for the view that an individual in the position of the appellant ought, without subjecting himself to a prosecution
for a criminal offence, to have some means of raising the question of the
legality of official acts, imposing constraint upon him in his daily conduct, which, on the grounds not unreasonable, he thinks are unauthorized and illegal. We think, however, that to accede to appellants contention upon this point would involve the consequence that virtually
every resident of Ontario could maintain a similar action; and we can
discover no firm ground on which the appellant's claim can be supported
which would not be equally available to sustain the right of any citizen of
a Province to initiate proceedings impeaching the constitutional validity
of any legislation directly affecting him, along with other citizens, in a
296[1924] 3 D.L.R. at 189.
" Id. at 191.
257 [1911] 1 K.B. 410
"2

(C.A.).

Id. at 419.

219 Id. at 421.
240 [1924] 3 D.L.R. at 193.
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similar way in his business or in his personal life.2"'
This same ab convenienti argument had been put forth on behalf of
the Attorney-General in Dyson. The House of Lords, however, quickly
dismissed the fear of consequential "innumerable actions" by indicating
the ultimate influence which the court can bring to bear in curtailing the
flow of such proceedings. Firstly, it is within the discretion of the Court
to refuse to make declaratory orders such as that requested by the plaintiff in Dyson. Secondly, it is appropriate for the court to punish with
costs those plaintiffs who bring unnecessary actions. In so countering the
inconvenience argument in Dyson, Lord Justice Farwell balanced the
floodgates fear against the public interest in judicial intervention:
[t]here is no substance in the apprehension, but if inconvenience is a
legitimate consideration at all, the inconvenience in the public interest is
all in favour of providing a speedy and easy access to the Courts for any
of His Majesty's subjects who have any real cause of complaint against
the exercise of statutory powers by Government departments, and Government officials, having regard to their growing tendency to claim the
right 2to62 act without regard to legal principles and without appeal to any
court.

The Smith Court, however, more fearful than was Lord Justice Farwell of the multiplicity of proceedings which might arise as a consequence
of according standing to a public interest litigant, chose to distinguish
Dyson.' 3 It held that Smith involved a decision upon a hypothetical set
of facts, while Dyson involved an official demand which was an illegal
attempt to constrain the plaintiff personally by an illegal threat addressed to him as an individual.2 In finding that the plaintiff had been
neither specially affected nor exceptionally prejudiced by the challenged
legislative action, the Smith Court held that he had no status or standing
to bring his action.2 8 5 It then curiously proceeded to also rule on the merits, stating, "we are loath to give a judgement against the appellant solely
based upon a fairly disputable point of procedure; and accordingly, we
think it right to say that in our opinion the appellant's action also fails in
26 6
substance.
A closer look at Smith reveals that the Court was willing and eager to
adjudicate upon the substantive issues raised and yet it feared that to do
so would create a dangerous precedent for the laws of standing. Thus, it
proceeded to decide upon the merits while asserting that the plaintiff had
not established standing sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a deci261

Id.

2-6 [1911] 1 K.B. at 423.
263 Smith v. Attorney Gen. of Ont., [1924] 3 D.L.R. at 190.
26
265
266

Id. at 192.

Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
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sion on the merits. This contorted form of legal analysis would likely
never be found in a decision of the American Court where standing is
usually characterized as a threshold determinant. The American Court,
however, occasionally engages in the more clandestine practice of using
the determination on standing to disguise what is in fact a decision on the
2 7
merits.
Until 1974,268 the Smith pronouncement on standing was viewed as
having bolted the door of the Court to the airing of public interest issues.
The "exceptionally prejudiced" requirement effectively meant that any
legislation or official action which affected all members of the public
alike, albeit adversely, could not be challenged by individuals in the
courts. Only individuals who were asserting an essentially private right
could satisfy the standing requirement laid down by Smith. Public rights
as such could only be vindicated in the courts at the behest of the Attorney-General, the recognized "guardian" of the public interest 2 6
A.

The Role of the Attorney-General and the Extent of his Discretion

As chief law officer of the Crown, the Attorney-General derives his
role as legal representative of the public interest from the Crown's prerogative rights as parens patriae.Action may be brought in the name of
the Attorney-General to redress infringement of public rights either ex
proprio motu, i.e. on his own intitative or based upon information received from a member of the public, or ex relatione,i.e., where the Attorney-General permits the use of his name "on the relation of" an individ27 0
ual bringing an action.
Prior to either the instituting of an ex proprio motu action or consenting to an ex relatione action, it is the responsibility of the AttorneyGeneral to weigh all relevant factors to determine whether the prospective actions would indeed be in the public interest. 27 1 Although he is a
member of the government in power and a political appointee, "it is a
matter of clear constitutional doctrine that in the exercise of his discretion in this matter the Attorney-General has the duty to represent the
public interest with complete objectivity and detachment. "1' ' 2 Yet the exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion is generally held to be absolute, subject only to his general accountability to Parliament.7 3
'7

See generally, Tushnet, supra note 8, at 663-64, 699-700.

'68 See Thorson v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 43 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1974).
269 See Loggie v. Town of Chatham, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 583 (App. Div., N.B.); Jenkins v.
Winnipeg, [1941] 1 D.L.R. 477 (K.B., Man.).
170 See Comment, Right of Private Citizen to Litigate Questions Involving Public In-

terest, 56 CAN. B. REv. 331, 333 (1978).
271 See

(1978).

generally Note, Locus Standi, 12 U.

22 Jolowicz,

BRIT. COLUM.

L. REv. 320, 323 et. seq.

Some Twentieth Century Developments in Anglo-American Civil Procedure, 7 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 163, 208 (1978).
273 See J. EDWARDS, THE OFFICERS OF THE CRowN 289 (1964).
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On the whole, the courts have shrunk from questioning what is seen
as the "unfettered discretion" 274 exercised by the Attorney-General in his
decision as to whether to initiate or consent to proceedings to vindicate
the public interest. This reticence is clearly expressed as a constitutional
principle by the Earl of Halsbury, L.C., in his delivery of the judgement
of the House of Lords in London County Council v. Attorney-General:
[t]he initiation of the litigation, and the determination of the question
whether it is a proper case for the Attorney-General to proceed in, is a
matter entirely beyond the jurisdiction of this or any other court. It is a
question which the law
of this country has made to reside exclusively in
27 5
the Attorney-General.

The application of this principle by the Canadian courts has perpetuated the notion of the "untouchability" of the Attorney-General's discretion in public interest matters and the above reasoning of the Earl of
Halsbury has been consistently cited with approval in cases in which the
exercise of this discretion has been in issue. In Grant v. St. Lawrence
Seaway Authority,276 the principle was extended to disallow the plaintiff's attempted joinder of the Attorney-General as a defendant to a pub27
lic action for his refusal to consent to public interest proceedings. 7
1.

The English Rule Against Interference

The question of the extent to which the Attorney-General's discretionary refusal to consent to proceedings should be a controlling factor in
relation to the standing of a public interest litigant has been the subject
of some debate in recent English decisions.278 In Attorney-General ex rel.
McWhirter v. Independent BroadcastingAuthority,279 the Court of Appeal appeared to be asserting that the Attorney-General does not have a
monopoly on public interest representation and that his refusal to consent to proceedings might in certain circumstances not be determinative
of a litigant's standing. While acknowledging the absolute nature of the
Attorney-General's discretion as articulated in London County Council,2 0 Lord Denning, rendering the majority opinion in McWhirter, indi74

Cowan v. Canadian Broadcasting Co., 56 D.L.R.2d 578 (Ct. App. Ont. 1966).

275[1902] A.C. 165,
27623 D.L.R.2d 252
27 Id. at 257:

169 (H.L.).
(Ct. App. Ont. 1960).

the Attorney-General is not to be interfered with by the Courts in the exercise of
his discretion not to institute proceedings when requested to do so by some member of the public. To seek to add him as a defendant in an action such as this

which he has refused to institute, is nothing more or less than an attempt to flout
the exercise of the discretion vested in him to regularize a proceeding which by its
nature has no status in our Courts.
278 See generally LoRD DENNING, THE Discn'LIE OF LAW 113 et seq. (1979).
271 [1973] 1 All E.R. 689 (C.A.).
280 [1902] A.C. at 169.
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cated that in cases of extreme exigency where no other remedy is available, a plaintiff should be permitted to present his case before the court
without being forestalled by the fact that the Attorney-General has refused his consent. In the course of his analysis, the Master of the Rolls
declared:
[i]f the Attorney-General refuses leave in a proper case, or improperly or
unreasonably delays in giving leave, or his machinery works too slowly,
then a member of the public, who has a sufficient interest, can himself
apply to the court itself.... I regard it as a matter of high constitutional principle that if there is good ground for supposing that a government department or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is
about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures thousands of Her
Majesty's subjects, then in the last resort any one of those offended or
injured can draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek to have
the law enforced. But this, I would emphasize, is only the last resort
when there is no other remedy reasonably available to secure that the
law is obeyed.281
The suggestion that the appropriate avenue of complaint should be
through another branch of government, via the Minister or via the plaintiff's member of Parliament, was dismissed by Denning in short order:
"They are not so accessible. They are not so speedy or effective. They are
282
not so independent as the courts of law. 1
Lord Justice Cairns, in disagreement with Denning, saw the Attorney-General as the only plaintiff in a proper position to sue on behalf of
the public as a whole, and chose not to interfere with the discretion of the
Attorney-General, once exercised. He described the requirement of the
Attorney-General's consent as a "useful safeguard against merely cranky
proceedings and against a multiplicity of proceedings," and asserted that
the "risk of damage to the public interest" in withholding that consent
was far less serious than overriding the Attorney-General's discretion to
withhold the same by the Court.283 In contrast, any concern wih Denning
might have had about the multiplicity of proceedings was diminished by
his expressed horror at the image of injuriously affected plaintiff, albeit
suffering no differently from thousands of others, who is debarred from
28 4
the courts by the refusal of the Attorney-General to act.
The "high constitutional principle" expressed by Denning in McWhirter28 5 did not find favour with the House of Lords in the later deci281 [1973] 1 All E.R. at 698-99. Although Lord Denning expressly declined from restricting the circumstances in which an individual may be held to have a "sufficient interest," he
refers with approval to the Blackburn line of cases in which the plaintiffs were held to have
a "sufficient interest" even though shared with thousands of others. Id.

2 Id. at 699.
28'Id. at 703.
284
288

Id. at 698-99 (Denning, M.R.).
Id.
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sion of Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers," ' where the majority
judgement stated that only the Attorney-General could assert public
rights.28 7 Not only was Denning's "high constitutional principle" - as repeated in his adjudication of Gouriet in the court below - rejected, 28
but the entire Appeal Court judgement was criticized as being tainted by
"some confusion and an unaccustomed degree of rhetoric." 2 9 It is not
expedient, within the context of this article, to consider in detail the complexities of the Gouriet decision, which, in any event, has been more than
adequately done elsewhere.290 Cetain aspects of the case, however, are relevant to the present examination of standing as it is influenced by various
inhibitory notions of judicial restraint.
The inhibitory notion which would limit the role of the court to
strictly adversarial proceedings which are traditionally regarded as capable of judicial resolution is apparent in Lord Diplock's judgement in
Gouriet, where he asserted that "the jurisdiction of the court is not to
declare the law generally or to give advisory opinions: it is confined to
declaring contested legal rights, subsisting or future, of the parties represented in the litigation before it and not those of anyone else."29 1
Lord Edmund-Davies, who was somewhat critical of the AttorneyGeneral for his refusal to act on behalf of the plaintiff, considered in his
judgment the floodgates fear as a reason advanced on behalf of the Attorney-General for his refusal. Edmund-Davies was not moved by the argument that if public interest claims were consented to, the consequence
would be the opening of "the 'floodgates' to a multiplicy of claims by
busy-bodies," suggesting that there is no reason why such claims should
become more profuse than the present number of 29private
prosecutions in
2
criminal courts which are "few and far between."

[1977] 3 All E.R. 70 (H.L.), rev'g [1977] 1 All E.R. 696 (C.A.).
See Note, Locus Standi, 12 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 320, 334 (1978).
288 This principle, enunciated by Lord Denning in Attorney Gen. ex rel. McWhirter v.
Independent Broadcasting Auth., [1973] 1 All E.R. at 698-99, and repeated by him in the
court below, Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1977] 1 All E.R. at 703, was treated
as mere dicta by the House of Lords since the Attorney General had ultimately consented to
relator proceedings in McWhirter. Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1977] 3 All
E.R. at 85 (Wilberforce, L.J.).
289 [1977] 3 All E.R. at 95 (H.L.).
290 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 270, at 338-45; Note, supra note 271, at 328-38.
281 [1977] 3 All E.R. at 100 (Diplock, L.J.). As further stated by Lord Justice Diplock:
The only kind of rights with which courts of justice are concerned are legal rights;
and a court of civil jurisdiction is concerned with legal rights only when the aid of
the court is invoked by one party claiming a right against another party to protect
or enforce the right or to provide a remedy against that other party for infringement of it, or is invoked by either party to settle a dispute between them as to the
existence or nature of the right claimed.
Id.
292 Id. at 107 (Edmund-Davies, L.J.). He notes, however, that this may be attributable
to the power of the Attorney-General to enter a nolle prosequi or to order the Director of
Public Prosecutions to take over a case and then to offer no evidence. Id. Quaere, would the
288

287
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It was the opinion of the House of Lords that the relator action is not
something to be regarded as "archaic or obsolete.

29 3

Lord Justice Or-

mrod, in the Court below, had suggested that the Attorney-General's role
in relator proceedings is essentially fictional and that in fact the litigant
controls all aspects of the proceedings2S This was expressly rejected by
Lord Wilberforce and by Viscount Dilhorne. Lord Wilberforce, while acknowledging that in times past the granting of permission by the Attorney-General to use his name was a mere formality, asserted that his role
in relator proceedings has never been fictional and that in such proceedings the Attorney-General in no sense relinquishes control. 9 5 Viscount
Dilhorne noted that while "the conduct of the proceedings in such an
action is left in the hands of the relator, it is in his hands as agent for the
Attorney-General and its conduct is always under his control and discretion. ' '129 It was futher asserted by Lord Wilberforce that the exclusive
right of the Attorney-General to represent the public interest is neither
"technical, nor procedural, nor fictional. It is constitutional. 2

97

He based

his rejection of the suggestion that the standing of a public interest litigant should be left to the discretion of the Court on the separation of
powers notion. In his opinion, the Court is an inappropriate and illequipped body for the making of decisions as to the public interest and
the very fact that "decisions are of the type to attract political criticism
and controversy shows that they are outside the range of discretionary
problems which the courts can reslove. ' '9 8 The repetition of this inhibi-

tory notion is evidenced throughout each of the separate opinions of the
Gouriet case,2'" thus displaying a substantial influence on the decision of
the Court to deny standing.
2. The Canadian Exceptions to the Rule Against Non-Interference
The Canadian Supreme Court, notwithstanding its reluctance to upset the delicate balance of the separation of powers by overtly scrutinizing the exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion, has recognized four
basic exceptions to the role of the Attorney-General as the exclusive legal
representative of the public interest. That is to say, rather than critically
examining the refusal of the Attorney-General to bring public interest
proceedings, the Court has merely recognized certain situations in which
ultimate effect of such a power differ in any significant way from that of the civil courts to
exercise their discretion to deny standing or to prohibit frivolous and vexatious litigants?
193 Id. at 89.
214 [1977] 1 All E.R. at 728-30.
2 [1977] 3 All E.R. at 80.
1,6 Id. at 94 (Dilhorne, L.J.).
117 Id. at 83 (Wilberforce, L.J.).
299

Id. at 84.

See, e.g., id. at 95 (Dilhorne, L.J.); id. at 114 (Edmund-Davies, L.J.); id. at 119-20
(Fraser, L.J.).
"I
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an individual may stand in his own name before the court to advocate the
public interest.
Two of these exceptions were clearly stated in an English authority
decided by the Court of Appeal in 1903, Boyce v. Paddington Borough
Council:3 00
A plaiintiff can sue without joining the Attorney-General in two cases:
first, where the interference with the public right is such as that some
private right of his is at the same time interfered with ... ; and, sec-

ondly, where no private right is interfered with, but the plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffers special damage peculiar to himself from
the interference with the public right.30 1

The Boyce decision has been frequently cited with approval in subsequent Canadian cases for its articulation of these two exceptions to the
general rule that the Attorney-General has exclusive standing to litigate
public interest suits. One such case is Cowan v. CanadianBroadcasting
30 2
Corporation,
in which standing was denied to a plaintiff who sought to
advocate a public right. The plaintiff, a resident of Toronto, sought declarations and an injuction to forestall the conversion of a Toronto English
language broadcasting station controlled by the defendant publicly-owned
corporation into a exclusively French language station. It was his contention that if Parliament had authorized such a conversion, the enacting
legislation was ultra vires and furthermore that the required expenditures for the conversion had never been authorized by Parliament.0 8 The
Ontario Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff, in his attempt to assert
a purely public right, did not fit into either of the Boyce exceptions and
that to do so, he must have been more "particularly affected than other
30
people" by the allegedly illegal or unconstitutional action. '
The third exception to the rule precluding private plaintiffs from
public interest litigation unless under the auspicies of the Attorney-General relates to taxpayer actions. Mcllreith v. Hart30 5 is the locus classicus
which established that ratepayers have a right to bring action to challenge the validity of municipal expenditures. The standing for such action
is to be based upon the allegation of threatened financial loss because of
the additional or unnecessary taxes which will inevitably be imposed to
replenish the treasury.3° Prior to 1974, the notion of public interest
standing for taxpayers, as heralded in McIlreith, was not considered to be
00 [1903] 1 Ch. 109 (C.A.), aff'd sub nom. Paddington Corp. v. Attorney-Gen., (1906]
A.C. 1 (H.L.).
3*1 Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council, [1903] 1 Ch. at 114.
302 56 D.L.R.2d 578 (Ct. App. Ont. 1966).
303 Id. at 579.
:04
30

3"

Id. at 580-81.
39 Can. S. Ct. 657 (1908).

See G. STRAYER, supra note 21, at 117.
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applicable outside of the muncipal context." 7
B. Standing for a Truly Public Interest Litigant
1. Thorson
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Canada handed down a landmark decision which dynamically altered previous conceptions of the propriety of
public interest litigation and which presented another exception to the
conceived role of the Attorney-General as the exclusive legal representative of the public interest. In Thorson v. Attorney-General of Canada3 0 8
a private litigant who suffered no special damage and who asserted no
special status beyond that of a citizen and a taxpayer was granted the
opportunity to challenge the Canadian Official Language Act. Justice Laskin, in speaking for the majority, held that the question as to whether
such a litigant has standing ultimately lies in the discretion of the court
and that in exercising this discretion, the court should be mindful of the
nature of the impugned legislation and the justiciability of the issues
09
raised.
As to the nature of impugned legislation, Laskin appeared to be
drawing a pivotal distinction between the regulatory type on the one
hand, and the declaratory type on the other. He noted that the former
type of legislation, by its very nature, may produce a traditionally acceptable plaintiff so that a fortiori those taxpayers or citizens who are more
"remotely affected" by such legislation should be excluded:
Where regulatory legislation is the object of a claim of invalidity, being
legislation which puts certain persons, or certain activities theretofore
free of restraint, under a compulsory scheme to which such persons must
adhere on pain of a penalty or a prohibitory order or nullification of a
transaction in breach of the scheme, they may properly claim to be aggrieved or to have a tenable ground upon which to challenge the validity
of the legislation. In such a situation, a mere taxpayer or other member
of the public not directly
affected by the legislation would have no stand°
ing to impugn

it.31

Whereas the legislation in the Smith case would be characterized by
Laskin as being of the regulatory type, he characterizes the legislation in
issue in Thorson as being both declaratory and directory. The Court was
thereby able, by distinguishing Smith, to make way for a broader exercise
of judicial discretion on the standing issue. This latter type of legislation,
which creates no offenses, imposes no penalties, and lays no duties upon
members of the public, is not, by its very nature, likely to produce a tra307 See Smith v. Attorney-Gen. of Ont., [1924] 3 D.L.R. 189 (Can.); Loggie v. Town of
Chatham, 54 N.B. 230 (Ct. App. N.B. 1927).
308 43 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1974).
3" Id. at 17-18.
310 Id. at 8.
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ditionally acceptable plaintiff, for it usually affects all members of the
public alike. Therefore, to deny standing to any one plaintiff asserting the
public interest would be to deny standing to all.
Laskin voiced the same concern which was expressed in Flast but
rejected in Schlesinger and Richardson. That is to say, if the plaintiff
were denied access to the court, the validity of the impugned legislation
would be effectively immunized from constitutional challenge because
there would exist no other plaintiff in a better position to take up the
cause. Such a result was seen by Laskin to be "strange and indeed alarming, if there was no way in which a question of alleged excess of legislative
power, a matter tradtitonally within the scope of the judicial process,
could be made the subject of adjudication."31 1
The desire of the Court to avoid the "alarming" consequence of constitutional immunity appeared to overshadow any of the inhibitory notions of judicial restraint. In the judgement of the court below, 12 however, the floodgates fear was determinative of the standing issue. Justice
Houlden applied the restrictive rule articulated in Smith and was motivated by the same practical concerns. In the course of his reasons, he
declared:
If every taxpayer could bring an action to test the validity of a statute
that involved the expenditure of public money, it would in my view lead
to grave inconvenience and public disorder. It is for this reason, I believe,
that the plaintiff has been unable to find any Canadian
or English deci313
sion as authority for the position he is asserting.
This ab convenienti argument was quickly dismissed by Laskin as
adding nothing to the reasons for denying standing. In adopting the
Dyson refutation, he emphasized the importance of the discretionary control which the courts can exercise over the flow of proceedings "by directing a stay, and by imposing costs." 3 1 4 He also noted that McIlreith v.
3 16
Hart,
which opened wide the door to municipal ratepayer standing in
1908 "does not seem to have spawned any inordinate number of...
3 16
actions.
The second factor which the Court is to consider in the exercise of its
discretion is the justiciability of the issues sought to be raised. In this
respect, Justice Laskin asserted that the "question of the constitutionality of legislation has in Canada always been a justiciable question"3 17 and
that it is "the right of the citizenry to constitutional behaviour by
311 Id.

at 7.
Thorson v. Attorney Gen., 22 D.L.R.3d 274 (High Ct. Ont. 1971).
313Id. at 274.
314 43 D.L.R.3d at 6.
311 39 Can. S. Ct. 657 (1908).
316 43 D.L.R.3d at 7.
312

317

Id.

at 11.
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Parliament." '18
Probably more significant than any other aspect of the Thorson holding is this bold assertion of the right of citizenry to constitutional behaviour by Parliament with the implicit right of enforceability. The underlying concern appears to be that legislation not be immunized from
constitutional challenge by judicial review. To deny standing to plaintiffs
who are aggrieved by the effects of declaratory and directory legislation
would create such an immunization.
The plaintiff in Thorson was accorded standing because of his status
as a citizen, and because of rights flowing from that status, not merely
because of his status as a taxpayer and the alleged tax burden resulting
from an illegal expenditure.319 While labelling the attempt to found
standing on an alleged tax burden as "unreal," Laskin nevertheless engaged in an examination of the notion in a manner which would appear to
lend some validity to its application. He disapproved of the way in which
Smith restricted the doctrine of McIlreith v. Hart" ° to municipal ratepayers, asserting that a provincial or a federal taxpayer's tax burden resulting from an expenditure by their respective governments may be no
32
less than that of a municipal taxpayer. '
In turning his attention to the American treatment of taxpayer
standing, Laskin compared the Frothingham restriction to that in
Smith.3 2 2 He observed that both were invoked as a result of the same
concerns about "multiplicity of actions, inconvencience and the fact that
public and not special individual interest is involved. 3 23 The separation
of powers doctrine, however, which was more apparent in Frothingham,
was described by Laskin as "a more explicit matter in the United States
32 4
than it is here. '
In conjectural fashion, one might query whether Laskin would have
so quickly dismissed the separation of powers inhibition if Thorson had
been decided subsequent to the judgement of the House of Lords in
Gouriet. As evidenced in the above explication of this latter case, the notion of separation of powers persists in England as a ubiquitous inhibition
3"1

Id. at 19.

Thorson is the quintessence of a public interest suit. The standing which is granted
to the plaintiff is not based upon the assertion of injury (as for example, the financial injury
to a plaintiff resulting from an illegal expenditure), but upon the assertion of the status of
citizen and the rights which flow therefrom.
:20 39 Can. S. Ct. 657 (1908).
31 43 D.L.R.3d at 16. The population of Metropolitan Toronto and Montreal is greater
than that of each of seven of the Provinces of Canada. If the principle of McIlreith is applicable to municipal ratepayers' actions, why not to a provincial taxpayers' action to challenge
the constitutionality of legislation involving expenditure of public money where no other
means of challenge is open?
" See id. at 17, quoting Sutherland, J., in Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham), 262
U.S. at 486-87.
323 43 D.L.R.3d at 17.
31"

"

Id.
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to judical consideration of privately maintained public interest actions,
notwithstanding the absence of constitutional barriers. In Gouriet, the
House of Lords' unanimous and categorical statement that the AttorneyGeneral is the exclusive legal representative of the public interest was
influenced to a great extent by the judicial conception of the function of
the Court within the confines of a tripartite allocation of powers. Any
complaints arising out of the allegedly improper exercise of discretion by
the Attorney-General, according to their Lordships, should be aired not
in a legal, but a political forum.
In rendering his judgement in Thorson, Laskin cursorily considered
the notion that public interest actions may not be brought to the court
without the sanction of the Attorney-General. After briefly referring to
the condition set forth in the McWhirter case, i.e. that a private person's
right to instigate public interest proceedings is contingent upon a previous request having been made to the Attorney-General, and after remarking that, in any event, Thorson had met such a condition, Laskin
expressed doubt as to its applicability to the Canadian federal system of
government. 2 5 He noted that under the English unitary system of government, a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation - such as that
in Thorson - would not arise and therefore, the role of the AttorneyGeneral in that system as guardian of the public interest extends only to
the bringing of proceedings against subordinate delegated authorities.
This he contrasted with the Canadian federal system under which constitutional challenges may occur. 2 6 Implicit in his observation of the role of
the Attorney-General as the "legal officer of a Government obliged to enforce legislation enacted by Parliament"3 2 7 is the suggestion that because
of the affinity between the Attorney-General and the government in
power, he cannot always be relied upon to instigate, or consent to, proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, even if to do so
might be in the public interest. In contrast to the emphasis placed by the
Houue of Lords upon the immutability of the Attorney-General's exercise
of discretion, Laskin focused upon the odiousness of the possible immunization from constitutional challenge of legislation, which may adversely
affect the public in general, by the refusal of the Attorney-General to act.
In essence, Laskin appeared to be creating a fourth exception to the
conceived role of the Attorney-General as the exclusive representative of
the public interest, viz, independently maintained public interest actions
which challenge the constitutional validity of legislative or official action.
As such, this exception would not stand to be altered by the application in Canadian courts of the Gouriet decision. The Grouiet principles
can be distinguished, according to Laskin's treatment of McWhirter, as
germane only to the English unitary system of government - where con325
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stitutional challenges do not occur - and possibly to non-constitutionally
based challenges to illegal official action in Canada.
Is this to say that the purview of the broader pronouncements which
Thorson provides regarding standing does not extend beyond the constitutional context? Is the citizen or taxpayer type of standing fashioned in
the Thorson case to be entirely unavailable to plaintiffs seeking to challenge illegal official action? 28 It would appear from the wording of Thorson - whcih is carefully limited to a constitutional context - that these
questions are to be answered in the affirmative. Until a challenge to fllegal official action by a litigant basing his standing upon Thorson-type
grounds comes before the Supreme Court, however, the lines of demarcation cannot be drawn with any certainty.
Thus far, those cases which have considered the possible extension of
the Thorson exception beyond the constitutional context have been discordant. The Federal Court of Appeal in Re Rothmans of Pall Mall Canada Ltd. and Minister of NationalRevenue s2 9 and the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Rosenberg v. Grand River ConservationAuthority330 both held
that the relaxed rules of standing articulated by Thorson did not extend
to public interest suits for the challenge of illegal official action,38 1 but the
Manitoba Court of Appeal in Stein v. City of Winnipege 32 and the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal in Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Bedford
Service Commission33 appear to have reached the opposite conclusion.
2. McNeil
One year after the Thorson decision, the Supreme Court of Canada
was again confronted with a public interest action in which standing was
in issue. Like Thorson, Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil33 involved a constitutional challenge - this time to the validity of the Nova
Scotia Theatres and Amusements Act33 5 and some of the regulations
promulgated thereunder. The plaintiff in McNeil was the editor of a provincial newspaper who was upset by the banning of the film, "Last Tango
in Paris." In his action for a declaratory judgement, he alleged that the
very establishment of the instrumentality of the movie censorship board
by provincial statute constituted a violation of section 91 (27) of the
B.N.A. Act as an encroachment on the federal criminal power.3 38
See Mullan, Standing After McNeil, 8 OrrAwA L. REv. 32, 42 et seq. (1976).
67 D.L.R.3d 505 (Ct. App. Can. 1976).
330 69 D.L.R.3d 384 (Ct. App. Ont. 1976).
331 Id. at 395; Re Rothmans of Pall Mall Canada Ltd. and Minister of Nat'l Revenue, 67
D.L.R.3d at 513.
3
48 D.L.R.3d 223 (Ct. App. Man. 1974).
:
72 D.L.R.3d 639 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. N.S. 1976).
" 55 D.L.R.3d 632 (Can.1975).
336 N. S. REv. STAT. c. 304 (1967).
334 55 D.L.R.3d at 634. See 84 D.L.R.3d 1, 22 (Can. 1978).
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The legislation attacked in McNeil was clearly as regulatory as that
in Smith. It created offenses and imposed penalties and by its very nature
was likely to create a traditional type of plaintiff who could allege "exceptional prejudice" or "special injury," i.e. the theatre owners and operators
and the film distributors. The discretion of the Court was nevertheless
exercised so as to accord standing to the plaintiff as a representative of
the members of the general public. In delivering the majority judgement
in McNeil, Chief Justice Laskin emphasized that the regulatory/declaratory distinction suggested by the Thorson case could not be a controlling
one. 3S 7 In exercising its discretion to grant standing for the challenge of
the regulatory legislation, however, the Court required that at least an
arguable case be made out that the impugned enactment directly affected
members of the public, and that there existed no other practicable means
to test the constitutionality of the legislation.3 3 8 In determining whether
members of the general public were "directly affected" by the legislation
in question, Laskin asserted that notwithstanding the fact that the Act
directly regulated theatre operators and film distributors, it also "strikes
3
at the members of the public in one of its central aspects. 39
Laskin implicitly reiterated the concern he expressed in Thorson regarding the possible immunization of unconstitutional legislation in his
adoption of the wording of Judge Hart, who originally considered the McNeil case:
[t]he film exchange and theatre owners would not have an interest similar to that of the members of the public and there could be a large number of persons with a valid desire to challenge the prohibitory aspects of
the legislation who have no vehicle through which to effect their purpose
unless granted standing before the court.3 0 (emphasis added)
While the notion of "valid desire" is not enucleated, the factual situation
canvassed by the Courts" revealed an apparent unwillingness on the part
of those directly regulated to challenge the constitutionality of the impugned legislation and one can only surmise that this unwillingness existed because of a lack of principled motivation or "valid desire."
The undisguised examination by the McNeil Court of the factual situation was accompanied by an unabashed approbation of a joint standing/merits examination. The notion of standing as a strictly threshold determinant appears to hold little sway with the Supreme Court of Canada.
According to Chief Justice Laskin, where
337Id. at 635.
338Id. at 637.
339 Id.
340 Id.

at 636, quoting the trial court opinion, McNeil v. Nova Scotia Bd. of Censors, 46
D.L.R.3d 259, 266 (Super. Ct. N.S. 1974).

'41The Court adopted the statement of Justice Macdonald at the Appeal Division that
"the factual situation has some relevancy to the determination of this question [of standing]." 53 D.L.R.3d 259, 266 (App. Div. N.S. 1974).
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[t]here is an arguable case for according standing, it is preferable to have
all the issues in the case, whether going to procedural regularity or propriety or to the merits, decided at the same time. A thoroughgoing examination of the challenged statute could have a bearing in clarifying any
disputed question on standing.3 2

In light of the fact that a "serious,. .. substantial constitutional issue"343 was raised by the plaintiff for adjudication, that he had taken "all
steps that he could reasonably be required to take in order to make the
question of his standing ripe for consideration, ' 3 4 that those more directly affected had not taken a litigious initiative and that "there appear[ed] to be no other way, practically speaking, to subject the challenged Act to judicial review, '' 3 5 the Court considered the action was an
appropriate one in which to accord standing.
IV. A COMPARATivE ANALYSIS

The foregoing examination reveals certain essential differences in the
treatment of the concept of standing in relation to public interest litigation by the Canadian and American Courts. One major distinction which
goes to the very heart of the matter involves the respective perceptions of
the Court as "guardian of the Constitution." In Canada, reference proceedings facilitate the per se consideration of the constitutionality of legislation by the judiciary. Futhermore, as was confirmed in Thorson, the
"question of the constitutionality of legislation has [in Canada] always
been a justiciable question. ' ' 46 In the United States, however, where
there is "no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the
ground that they are unconsitutional, ' 3' 47 there is a general judicial reluctance to confront constitutional issues unless unavoidable. 348 Since the
landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison,349 it has been within the recognized powers of the Judiciary to rule on the constitutionality of legislation, but only when crucial to the determination of actual cases or controversies brought to the Court by proper parties.
Secondly, there exists in Canada a recognized "right of the citizenry
to constitutional behaviour by Parliament, 35 0 together with an implicit
right of enforceability by public interest litigants when no other means of
challenge is apparent.3 51 The prevailing concern is that ostensibly uncon55 D.L.R.3d at 633-34.
Id. at 634.
31 Id. at 635.
3,1 Id. at 637.
3" Thorson v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 43 D.L.R.3d at 19.
34 Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham), 262 U.S. at 488.
:48 See note 45 supra; see also text accompanying notes 221-23 supra.
4' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
:soThorson v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 43 D.L.R.3d at 19.
51 See text accompanying notes 317-19 supra.
34,
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stitutional legislation not be immunized from public challenge. Notwithstanding the notoriety of the 'inalienableness' of American constitutional
rights, there exists in the United States no such right to challenge unconstitutional legislation.3 52 Whereas in Canada the "no other plaintiff" notion is a plus factor in the exercise of the Court's discretion on the standing issue, the American Court has recently suggested that the absence of
nature of the
a more appropriate plaintiff is indicative of the political
3 53
issue and hence the impropriety of judicial intervention.
Thirdly, the American constitutionalization of the standing concept
must be distinguished from the Canadian discretionary approach. While
the application of standing principles in the United States at times reflects the admixture of constitutional requirements and a policy of judicial restraint, there does not exist the same constitutional 3freedom that
the Canadian courts have to confer discretionary standing. "
A fourth distinguishing feature lies in the consideration by the Court
of the aspect of justiciability. The Canadian Court may properly consider
the justiciability of the issues raised as one of several relevant aspects355
in the exercise of its discretion on the question of whether to confer
standing. The American conception of justiciability is somewhat different:
justiciability is seen as the broader rubric under which standing is merely
an aspect, 3 8 and as the "term of art" used to describe the constitutional
limitation set forth by article HI.357 According to the Court in Flast, the
fact that the substantive issues in the litigation might not be justiciable is
not a relevant factor in determining the standing of the prospective
plaintiff.
This brings us to the fifth major distinguishing feature. In two of the
Canadian cases discussed above, Smith and McNeil, the Court displayed
a tendency to engage in a concomitant examination of the merits with the
incipient determination of standing. This is to be contrasted with the approach of the American Court which persistently refers to standing as a
"threshold determinant" which must be undertaken in advance of any
consideration of the merits. It should, however, be noted that this distinction is largely one of word and not of deed, for the American Court often
looks prematurely at the merits either under the pretence of causational
analysis or under the pretence of ruling on the standing issue when in
actual fact they wish to disguise a decision on the merits. 55
311 See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
"I See text accompanying note 230 supra.
31" An academic argument has been made, however, that the constitutionalization of

"injury in fact" was not essential under a historical interpretation of Article III. See Jaffe,
supra note 2, at 1034-37; Berger, supra note 108, at 817-19.
355 Other relevant aspects include the nature of the legislation, the availability of other
plaintiffs or other means of challenge, etc.
351 See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
:'7 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 95.
sB8See text accompanying note 267 supra; see also Tushnet, supra note 8, at 663-64,
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V.

SYosIS

The purpose of this article has not been to attempt an enucleation or
collation of the various catchwords or shibboleths of standing,3 59 nor to
undertake an intricate comparative analysis of the treatment of the concept of standing in the United States and Canada,3 6 0 nor to assay the
exigency of the very existence and application of the concept. Rather, it
has been to propound a rational conceptual framework 6 1 within which
the judicial application of the concept of standing can be examined and
to determine the relationship of standing as seen within this framework
to the phenomenon of public interest litigation. The evolution of the variously articclated shibboleths of standing in the American and Canadian
Courts has been traced to demonstrate the efficacy of the propounded
conceptual framework as a practical tool in the dissection of the standing
concept.
The Courts are keenly aware of the potential ramifications of judicial
intervention into public interest controversies and as a result, they choose
to either extend or withdraw "the arm of justice" according to the cumulative magnitude of the prevailing notions inhibiting such intervention.
The role of the Court, the power of the Court, the limited resources of the
Court - these inhibitory notions, notwithstanding the constant judicial
modification in the articulation of the shibboleths of standing, have consistently influenced the hospitableness of the judiciary to public interest
litigants and a priori will continue to do so.
The adoption and application of the propounded conceptual framework in the didactics of the concept of standing is therefore urged so that
theory and practice may correspond and so that the concept will cease to
be described as "among the most amorphous in the entire domain of pub362
lic law."

699-700.
'39 The word "shibboleth" is used in the sense of a test word or password. As the above
outline of cases has indicated, certain specific assertions must be made by public interest
litigants in order to persuade the Court of the appropriateness of their representational
status. The author suggests that these specific assertions operate symbolically as shibboleths
in that the failure to express the same to the satisfaction of the Court will result in the
prospective litigants being turned away from the door of the Court at its very threshold.
Some of the shibboleths of standing are: "injury in fact," "direct concrete injury," "special
interest," "exceptional prejudice," "directly affected," "zone of interests" and "personal
stake."
360

The question of the extent to which the Canadian "novel approach" to standing

would be advantageous, if indeed adaptable to the United States, is examined in Wilson,
supra note 67.
3" See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 663.
"

See JudicialReview Hearings, supra note 6, at 498 (statement of Paul A. Freund).

